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From the Dean)s Desk:

The Class of '73
On May 21, 1973, the Law School graduated the
largest class in its history, with 212 students receiving
the J.D. degree. It was also the most diverse class in
history, with 21 women and 8 blacks among the graduates. Our classes will not grow larger in the future.
They will probably number about 200, a norm much
larger than the traditional size of only a few years ago,
but smaller than the Class of 1973. However, the proportion of women and minority group students is very
likely to continue rising. As I write this message in
early July, over
90% of this
year's graduates
have jobs, and
by September I
expect this will
be true of 100%.
Most of our
graduates enter
private practice.
Some do so after
a year or two in
judicial clerkships which attract about 20% of the
graduating classes. Ten to twelve per cent of the
young lawyers work in public interest and community
service law firms. More would do so if the opportunities were available. Private firms in Philadelphia
and New York continue to take large numbers of our
graduates-49 so far this year, but the rest of the
country has opened wide, with the west coast continuing to grow in popularity. It is a mark of our
students' abilities and attractiveness and of the quality
and reputation of their legal education that in a relatively tight buyer's market, the Penn J.D. is in heavy
demand.
This year has seen the excitement of new curricular
developments and new faculty. It has also witnessed

growth in the development of student litigation, research and service activities. These will be detailed in
my Annual Report for 1972-73. Suffice it for now to
note that the diversity and depth of legal education at
Penn, the striving for excellence by faculty and students, and their dedication to law and justice leave no
room or justification for cynicism. Continuing inequalities of opportunity, Watergate, a bankrupt criminal
justice system-these are not excuses for despair. They
are taken as challenges at Penn, as reasons for law
and justice and for the education of people devoted to
those goals. Watergate does not call for indictment of
Law but for a recognition of the nation 's dependence
on law and on lawyers, in and out of government, who
are not above it.
The School's relationships with its alumni have never
been more fruitful or satisfying. The Law Board, the
Alumni Society, The Order of Coif, these groups and
others, and many, many individuals provide advice,
program enrichment and encouragement to our students and faculty. Later in the year I will report on the
extraordinary achievements of the Development Steering Committee and the Annual Giving leadership. All
of this bespeaks the harmony and commonality of
purpose that bind alumni and School together and add
unique strength to our educational enterprise by
utilizing all the resources , intellectual and material, that
able and dedicated lawyers make available. The School,
and society as a whole, are the richer.
lt was pleasant seeing so many of you here last May
on Law Alumni Day. This is your School and we hope
you will visit it as often as you can.

Remember A. A. G.
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Death Penalty:

Pennsylvania
State Senator
Robert Rovner:

A former
Assistant District
Attorney in
Philadelphia
and a partner in
the firm of Katz
and Rovner

The
CaseFor
By Robert A. Rovner

The issue of capital punishment has been one of the
most continuous and fiercely debated in our history.
Since 1846, several States, some 15 in number, have
completely abolished capital punishment, and of these,
11 have reinstated the death penalty. Of these 11, 3
have reabolished capital punishment. At the moment,
there are only 10 States of the 50 that have abolished
the death penalty. Further evidence of the strong resurgence in support for capital punishment, is the action of the United States House of Representatives in
voting for the death penalty for aircraft hijacl<ings on
October 2, 1972 by a margin of 354 to 2.
On June 29, 1972, the United States Supreme
Court ruled on the issue in the now famous decision in
Furman v. Georgia. This decision has been widely
misconstrued to hold that capital punishment was
abolished for all purposes. This is not the case, as a
reading of the decision will clearly show.
The precise holding in Furman is, to say the least,
difficult to state. Each of the nine Justices wrote a
separate opinion, expressing a wide contrariety of
views, spread over 233 pages of the United States
Reports. There was no opinion for the Court. The
per curiam order of reversal rested on the votes of five
Justices-Douglas, Brennan, Stewart, White and
Marshall-each of whom wrote a concurring opinion
in which none of their brethren joined. The four dissenting votes-cast by Chief Justice Warren Burger
and Justices Blackman, Powell and Rehnquist-found
no constitutional infirmity in the death penalty per se,
or in the manner of its imposition in the cases before
the Court. Three of the dissenting opinions, by the
Chief Justice, and Justices Powell and Rehnquist, were
joined by all four of the dissenting Justices.
A detailed analysis of the nine opinions in Furman
4
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would unduly lengthen this article. However, I believe
it would be useful , at this point to state very briefly
what appears to be the principal thrusts of the key
opinions, and the practical effect of the Furman decision from the standpoint of future legislative initiatives.
Only two Justices, Brennan and Marshall, concluded, on the basis of somewhat differing theories,
that the death penalty is unconstitutional per se. Justices Stewart, White and Douglas based their concurrences on their conclusions that the statutes before the
Court, in leaving the imposition of the death penalty to
the unfettered discretion of the judge or jury, led to arbitrary and discriminatory impositions of the penalty.
Each of the latter three Justices made it clear that
he was not reaching the question whether mandatory
death penalty statutes would be invalid. The practical
effect of Furman, therefore, appears to be to leave to the
Congress and the State Legislatures some le~way to
devise new statutory mechanisms for the imposition of
the death penalty, provided such mechanisms restrict
sentencing discretion and ensure increased rationality
in patterns of death sentence imposition. This reading of
Furman is supported by a detailed analysis of the decision, particularly by the following statement from
Justice Burger's dissenting opiniondefinitive statement as to the parameters of
the Court's ruling, it is clear that if state
legislatures and the Congress wish to maintain the availability of capital punishment,
significant statutory changes will have to be
made. Since the two pivotal concurring opinions [Justices Stewart and White] turn on the
assumption that the punishment of death is
now meted out in a random and unpredict(Continued on page 16)
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Death Penalty:

The

Case
Against

Fred Speaker:

Former Attorney
General of
Pennsylvania
and a partner in
the firm of
Pepper,
Hamilton &
Scheetz

By Fred Speaker

Once again we turn to the bloody business of savage murder and violent retribution.
Again this year, as in virtually every one of the
past three hundred years of Pennsylvania history, the
debate about the Death Penalty has wracked and divided this Commonwealth.
Almost a year ago the Supreme Court of the United
States spoke what could have been the ultimate words
in the dispute. The full Court, examining death decrees in murder and rape cases, held that:
... the imposition and carrying out of the
death penalty in these cases constitutes cruel
and unusual punishment in violation of the
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.l
The Supreme Court specifically extended this holding2 to the Pennsylvania Death Penalty statute; but the
several proposals for restoration now before the General Assembly demonstrate, sadly, that the issue has
not yet been laid to rest.
The Death Penalty should be kept from Pennsylvania. It can not be made constitutional. Even if it could,
we should let others follow that gory course and turn
our attention to ways to protect and promote human
life.
DeterrenceThe proponents of the Death Penalty have advanced
various arguments in its support. Some see a Biblical
imperative. Others seek vengeance. Some argue that
it is the ultimate weapon against recividism-or is a
device to force guilty pleas. But it is the claim that the
Death Penalty is a deterrent that is the basis for most
of the support.
Does the Death Penalty deter crime? There is
no solid evidence that it does. As the United Nations
study ~ of the effect of the Death Penalty world-wide
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has shown, there is no statistical evidence that establishes the existence of a deterrence when compared to
the deterrent effect of a life sentence.
History presents some strong arguments against the
belief that executions deter. Capital crimes proliferated
when executions were common. When pickpockets
were publicly hanged in England, it was not safe to
be in the crowd because there were so many pickpockets at work. We even read recent FBI reports that
show murder of police officers decreased in the half
year after the Supreme Court outlawed the Death
Penalty.
This history is not cited to show that the electric
chair or the gas chamber encourages murder-although some make that claim. 4 It is cited to show
the impossibility of proving that it prevents murder.
Yet the burden of proof must be on those who
would deliberately take life in order to protect life. It
is the terrible burden of those who argue that it is a
deterrent to prove their case-a burden not yet shouldered and impossible of carrying.
Some argue that deterrence defies statistical proof
-but can be established by human experience or by
logic. But for every isolated interview cited-where a
felon claims he didn't carry a weapon because he
feared the chair-there can be cited the case of a
psychotic or an exhibitionist5 incited by the Death
Penalty to kill.
Similarly, logic fails. Surely, if the Death Penalty
deterred murder, when capital punishment was still
imposed there would have been more killing in states
relying solely on life imprisonment than in capital
punishment states. It didn't happen. 6 If the logic held,
the rate of murder would have increased after a state
(Continued on page 18)
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A Case
Screening
Innovation:

A.R.D.

Arlen Specter:

District Attorney
of Philadelphia

By Arlen Specter

The courtroom scene is strikingly different. The
judge, defendant, district attorney and defense lawyer
sit around a small conference table. The judge can be
identified from the introductions but not from his attire-he wears a business suit instead of a robe.
The defendant sits close enough to reach over and
grab the judge if he is unhappy with the result. But he
does not, because he has reason to be pleased with what
goes on there. And so do the police, the district attorney,
the court system and the public.
The approach is as unique as the furniture arrangement. There is no interest in punishment or even in
determining guilt. Rather, the concern is to save the
defendant from the criminal justice system and to save
the system itself by saving the time and talents of the
police, the prosecutor and the judiciary.
The Anglo-Saxon criminal justice system has lumbered along for centuries, adding many new lawsmany of which are now unenforceable-and many new
procedures-many of which are now obsolete. Even

Levin Takes Post II
II Professor
A. Leo Levin has been appointed Executive Director of the National Commission on Revision of the Federal Court Appellate System. The
Commission, created by Congress last fall, has 16
members, 4 appointed by the President, 4 by the Chief
Justice of the United States, 4 by the Speaker of the
House of Representatives, and 4 by the President Pro
Tempore of the Senate. The Commission's purpose is
two-fold:
(a) to study the present division of the United
States into the several judicial circuits and to report
(Continued on page 30)
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to the President, the Congress, and the Chief Justice
those who labor daily within the system often can not
agree on its objectives, but virtually everyone agrees
that the system does not work.
The criminal courts are clogged with the prosecution of lesser offenses. With limited numbers of judges,
courtrooms and supporting personnel, the rapes, robberies and killings should receive priority attention.
And we know that the defendant, who gets caught
in the revolving door of criminal justice, is likely to
move up the ladder ·of serious crimes if he cannot be
pulled out of the cycle at an early stage.
These were some of the reasons that led us early in
1971 to experiment in Philadelphia with a new program which was then called Pre-Indictment Probation,
but which now shoulders the unwieldy title of Accelerated Rehabilitative Disposition.
After Pennsylvania Superior Court Judge J. Sidney
Hoffman and the Philadelphia District Attorney's Office formulated the program, Judge Hoffman presented
the proposal to his Court which unanimously approved
it as conceived. At the same time, the District Attorney's Office discussed the proposal in a series of meetings with the Justices of the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court and leading representatives of the Philadelphia
and Pennsylvania Bar.
Late in the Fall of 1970, Judge Hoffman and I made
a formal request that the Supreme Court permit such
an experimental program and on January 7, 1971, the
Supreme Court entered an order authorizing the institution of such a program and the assignment of
Judge Hoffman to that program, both for a period of
six months. On January 21, 1971, the new program
was publicly announced.
The program was designed primarily for first of(Continued on page 22)
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Coif:

Louis H. Pollak:
Former Dean of
the Yale Law
School

'There Is
Much To
Be Done'
By Louis H. Pollak

My task-my very happy task-is to congratulate
you on your achievements-achievements which augur
well for the future-and to welcome you into the
sorority/ fraternity of Coif and (subject to further examination) of the bar.* It is a task for which, though
I stand here cloaked with apparent authority, I in fact
lack the proper credentials. And, given the importance
which attaches these days to full public disclosure, I
will make my disclaimers patent at the outset. Although I count myself a lawyer, I don't know that I
can so describe myself in this company; First, there
is the fact that I am not a member of the bar of this
Commonwealth . I am admitted to the bar in New
York and in Connecticut, but I understand that sub
specie aeternitatis-which, roughly translated, means
in the view of Philadelphia lawyers-each of these is
a lesser bar, without the law. Of course I hope that
some day I can be permitted to repair the deficiency
and be admitted here in Pennsylvania; and I have
been assured by Dean Wolfman and other leaders of
the Pennsylvania bar that they will be glad to assist
me in the endeavor insofar as it can be accomplished
without prejudice to the professional standards prevailing in this jurisdiction. My graver disability-one
which even Dean Wolfman and Bernard Segal together
are powerless to remedy-is that I am not a member
of Coif. As to this, I can only throw myself on the
mercy of the court. For whatever good it may do, I
will cite you a modest, and possibly applicable, precedent: In 1948, at the annual banquet of a magazine
which will remain anonymous but which, for the purpose of cloaking its identity, I will denominate the

*Address at the Annual Meeting of the University of Pennsylvania Chapter of Coif, 11 June 1973.
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Yale Law Journal, the toastmaster was one Thurman
Arnold. He expressed his pleasure at being called into
service by the editors of the Journal, but he expressed
reservations as to the appropriateness of his selection.
He recalled to his audience a somewhat earlier occasion when he and Chief Justice Stone were speakers
at a banquet of a magazine which must remain anonymous but which, for the purpose of cloaking its identity, I will denominate the Harvard Law Review. The
Chief Justice, so reported Thurman Arnold, devoted
much of his speech to a discourse on the educational
values accruing from work as an editor of a law review. "'I am sure,' said the Chief Justice, "that Judge
Arnold will agree with me that the hours of his student
career which were most beneficial were those he devoted to the work of the Review'." And, so Arnold
recalled, "when the Chief Justice said in no uncertain
terms, 'I am sure Judge Arnold will agree,' I found I
(Continued on page 25)

II Ruth &. Co. To D.c. II
Henry S. Ruth, Jr., '55, has been appointed Deputy
Special Prosecutor in the Watergate affair-the Number 2 man-appointed to the position by the Special
Prosecutor, Archibald Cox. Ruth was a member of
the Law School Faculty from 1967-69.
Joseph J. Connolly, '65, has also been appointed
to the legal staff of the Watergate Special Prosecution
Unit. He served in the Solicitor General's office from
1968 to 1970, among other federal appointments, and
was most recently a member of the Philadelphia firm
of Ewing and Cohen.
Ruth, 42, will help formulate strategy for the wide
(Continued on page 30)
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Is A
College
Degree

A Must?
By William R. Powell

Is a college degree really necessary? Does it deserve
its station as a virtual exception-free prerequisite to
entry into the worlds of business and finance-not
to mention the higher ranges of academe-the graduate and professional schools?
What is sacred about a BA or a BS? Are they
worth 4 years and $5,000 to $20,000?
Do they really distinguish the talented from the
talentless or the less talented? Isn't experience worth
anything or if it is, how much? Can it be the equal
of four years in a diploma mill?
And if experience is underrated who are the
losers? Is it just the diploma-less young men or women
with their four or five years of on the job training
in the real world-or is it employers as well?
These are just a few of the questions which more
and more businessmen and professional leaders are
asking.
What follows are one man's thoughts on the subject.
What is wrong with the current college/ work
cycle?
Why are we selling college to America's youth as a
launching pad for the things which are commonly
known as the "good life"? Why do we package and
advertise college as THE means of getting better jobs?
And finally, why are we doing these things at the same
time that graduates of Harvard University and MIT
are forced to take jobs as taxi drivers on the streets
of Boston?
Don't panic gentlemen and women of the bar. I do
not wish to take issue with the assumptions made
about the benefits of orthodox education. I know what
your LL.B.'s and J.D.'s mean to you. I want only, by
this article, to take a close look at what I perceive
to be orthodox education's greatest shortcoming-the

all purpose four year, degree granting factory, aimed
at the so-called college age population, and almost
universally accepted by all as the stepping stone to
those "better" jobs.
Perhaps the initial point of this discussion should
be the rethinking of our entire premise of American
life and that of the American educational system. That
is the premise that all college graduates are guaranteed
"better" jobs.
Most young adults have been propagandized into
believing that a college degree is a necessary and perhaps even a sufficient precondition for success.
The problem with this thinking is simple : the economy is not geared to guaranteeing these presumptive
better jobs. Also the American educational system is
also not geared to train for such jobs.
The ethics of pressuring our young into college when
our system is not ready for them upon graduation is
very questionable, if not patent fraud.
What we have done, in effect, is create two types
of employment : the "better" jobs reserved for the college graduate, who more times than not may not be
as qualified for a specific job as the non-degree graduate, and the lesser grade jobs, the so-called "back-up"
personnel automatically translated "low-level."
What we are doing is destroying the vitality and
spirit of our young people. We are forcing them into
college, denying them an option, indeed limiting their
perspectives.
Professor Blanche D. Blank of Hunter College in a
recent article in the American Association of University Professors Bulletin proposes a solution to this dilemma. Ban the college degree as a prerequisite to
employment. Outlaw employment discrimination based
on college degrees much the same as discrimination by
sex, age, race, religion, or national origin has been
outlawed.
While on the surface Professor Blank's solution may
seem somewhat radical, a careful analysis of the facts
indicates that the plan may have merit.
(Continued on page 28)

II New Ombudsman
Professor James 0 . Freedman has been appointed
ombudsman of the University for a two-year term
effective July 1, 1973 .
As ombudsman, Freedman will provide assistance
to members of the University who have not been able
to secure satisfactory resolutions to problems and misunderstandings through normal University procedures.
Investigations by the ombudsman will proceed from
specific complaints by students, faculty or staff, and will
not be initiated unilaterally by the ombudsman.
Dr. Joel 0. Conarroe, associate professor of English, was appointed the University's first ombudsman
(Continued on page 31)
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Woman
In The
Law:

Sharon
Wallis, '67:
Chairwoman of
the Philadelphia
Women's
Political Caucus

Wallis
By Mary Jane Holland

Sharon Wallis, who was graduated from the University of Pennsylvania's School of Law in 1967, is not
a typical lawyer.
She lives in a warehouse, is married to a sculptor
and seldom gets dressed in anything fancier than jeans.
More importantly, few 29-year-old lawyers have the
string of activities and successes that she has had.
First, she is chairwoman of the Philadelphia Women's Political Caucus, a Democratic committeewoman
in her ward, and chairwoman of the Philadelphia Bar
Association's Consumer Protection Agency.
She is also on the governing board of the Employment Discrimination Referral Project of the Philadelphia Bar Association and the Lawyers Committee, is
active in the North Philadelphia Tenants Union and is
treasurer of the Law Alumni Society of the University
of Pennsylvania.
She has also filed and argued a case which resulted

Jones Selected

II

Frank N. Jones, a lawyer born in Clarksdale,
Mississippi, has been appointed Vice-Dean of the Law
School. Jones will assume this senior administrative
post on August 1, 1973.
Since September, 1971, Jones has served as Executive Director of the National Legal Aid and Defender Association. Born in 1933, he has his LL.B .
from De Paul University College of Law and his
LL.M. from New York University School of Law
where he was an Arthur Garfield Hays Fellow.
Prior to joining the National Legal Aid and Defender Association, Jones was Deputy Associate
(Continued on page 32)
Summer 1973

Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014

in a landmark decision by a Federal District Court, is
acttve in her own law firm (Temin, Wallis and Cohen,
which specializes in women's nghts cases), and in her
spare time manages to teach a women's rights course
at the University of Pennsylvania and a poverty law
course at Temple University's School of Law.
Also, she is modest enough that she can recite all
of these activities without even a hint of bragging.
Ms. Wallis, who obviously thrives on activtty, is an
advocate of the women's movement, and is excited
about the prospect of more and more women getting
involved, particularly in politics.
'The motivation is developing now-the indicator
is the number of women who are going to law school
now," she said.
"The best thing is for women to prepare themselves
for leadership roles and an excellent way of doing this
is by going to law school.
'The goal is greater involvement of women in politics in a leadership role-and law school is a great way
to get training."
Ms. Wallis is already involved in politics. Last year,
in addition to being a Democratic committeewoman,
she was involved in challenging the delegations to the
Democratic national convention.
"Rules require the participation of women, youth,
and minorities in the slating process. The selection
process was supposed to be open, but there were not
enough women in on it. The way it worked, not everyone could file. You had to have the candidate's approval.
"The process should be open to the public at large.
We challenged on that basis."
Tall, with long thick brown hair, and wearing jeans,
boots, a shirt and no make-up, Ms. Wallis doesn't
(Continued on page 30)
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Alumni: Listen

Professor
Stephen J.
Scbulhofer:

with interest at
Federal Rules
seminar

Addresses
Alumni Day
luncheon

Diners: At the

University
Museum

Dean Wolfman:

At the
luncheon
podium
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Distinguished
Service Award
Recipient:

Bernard G.
Segal, '31 with
Norma Shapiro
and
Dean Wolfman

Panelist:

Hon. Alfred L.
Luongo

Panelist:

Hon. Theodore
0 . Rogers

Panelist:

Hon. Ruggero J.
Aldisert

Law Alumni Day
The annual Law Alumni Day, held on May 4th,
was highlighted by a lively discussion of the proposed federal rules of evidence and dinner and cocktails
at the University Museum.
The dinner was keynoted by the Hon. Joseph S.
Lord, III, the chief Judge of the U.S. District Court for
the Eastern District of Pennsylvania and was followed
by a private screening of the film "Scorpio" at the
Duke Theater in C~nter City.
The festivities began with a noon luncheon honoring
the Classes of '08, '13, '23, '28, '33, '38, '43, '48, '53,
(Continued on page 33)

Dinner Speaker:

Hon. Joseph S.
Lord, III with
Dean Wolfman
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Dean Wolfman:

Flanked by
Professor
Schulhofer and
Alumni Society
President
Joseph P.
Flanagan, Jr.

Panel
Moderator:
Professor A.

Leo Levin

Dinner
Conversation:

At the University
Museum

L

Registration:

Alumni
check in
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Panelists and
Moderator:

Rogers, Levin,
Aldisert and
Luongo

Class of '08:

Leon Obermayer
and spouse

Former
Pennsylvania
Chief Justice:

John C. Bell,
Jr., with
Flanagan and
Alumni Day
chairman
Edwin P. Rome
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Graduates:
Assembled in
the courtyard

Commencement
Charles R. Halpern, Esq., founder and first director
of the Center for Law and Social Policy, became an
honorary fellow of the Law School at the annual
commencement exercises on May 21.
The ceremonies, held in the Law School Courtyard,
were also marked by the presentation of a model
of the Hsieh-Chai to vice dean James Strazzella, who
was leaving the Law School.
In his presentation to Mr. Halpern, Dean Bernard
Wolfman noted that Halpern's "career at the Bar has
shown how much the dedicated lawyer can accomplish when he has the will and imagination to move
beyond the time-worn grooves of conventional practice and to cut new channels through which the rights
and interests of the under-represented may find
(Continued on page 16)

Class President:
Peter Nelson
addresses the
graduates

Commencement
Dais: Another
view
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Former Vice
Dean: James

Strazzella with
Dean Wolfman

Honorary
Fellow: Charles
R. Halpern

Dean Wolfman:

Congratulates
Halpern
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Commencement
(Continued from page 14)

expression."
Not only has Halpern's work with the Center for
Law and Social Policy produced significant changes
in protection of the environment, protection of the
unorganized consumer, and protection of those institutionalized because of mental illness or retardation,
the Dean said, but it has also had a "notable influence
on legal education."
"That program," Dean Wolfman said, "was among
the first to provide law students with an opportunity
to participate directly in the conduct of challenging
litigation and to learn from the experience which
comes from actual exposure to the operations of the
legal system."
Among the awards presented to graduating students
were the Oscar Milton Davis Prize to Joseph H.
Wolfe, Jr., as the student who obtained the highest
grades for the third year; The Dean Jefferson B.
Fordham Human Rights Award to Jonathan L. F.
Silver, as the student who made the most outstanding
contribution to the advancement of individual freedom
and dignity; The Bureau of National Affairs Award,
to Dennis J. Braithwaite as the student who made the
most satisfactory progress in the third year; and The
Wiley C. Rutledge Memorial Award to Franklin J.
Hickman and Marjorie A. Silver for studies on law
enforcement and individual rights.
Peter C. Nelson, president of the class of 1973,
addressed the graduates and their guests.

Letters

II
To THE

EDITOR:

Marianne Durso defended what is, indefensible, and
has analogized with the past, what is, not analogous,
the graffiti of the present.
She has turned words inside out and upside down
by stating present day graffiti "is the silent majority
speaking out about themselves and their society." As
I understand the "code word"-the silent majorityit represents the white, affluent, conservative, middle
and working class, the overwhelming majority of whom
have done everything possible to distance themselves
from those primarily engaged in modern day graffiti:
the urban ghetto black teenager.
While American urban graffiti may be, in part, a
means of human communication, it is true that it is
"the sign of a thinking people ... the sign of a feeling
people . . . "? Maybe so. Maybe also, it is what it
appears to be: a wanton, willful, and malicious act of
aggressive hostility towards others. These feelings,
while explainable in terms of adolescent hostility, past
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deprivation, and present degradation, appear more
reasonable and to the point, than those expressed by
Ms. Durso.
The graffiti of the present conveys no message, tells
no story, and expresses no communication, other than
an effort to mark, scrawl, deface, and mutilate. Nowhere else in the Western World, from London, England, to Sydney, Australia, have there been similar
markings in modern times. Their absence has not
been noted with dismay.
Ms. Durso asserts that those responsible for graffiti
are "people (who) want to prove that they do exist
in this rat race of a world. Perhaps if we read these
'signs of the times' we could read the people of our
society, their wants, their needs, and their hopes."
Perhaps. Perhaps also, all our needs and hopes would
have been better served if their needs and hopes had
not resulted in these unfortunate expressions of
human communication.
The "times" would have been better served without
these "signs."
Edward L. Snitzer, '55

Rovner
(Continued from page 4)

able manner, iegislative bodies may seek to
bring their laws into compliance with the
Court's ruling by providing standards for
juries and judges to follow in determining
the sentence in capital cases or by more
narrowly defining the crimes for which the
penalty is to be imposed."
" ... legislative bodies have been given the
opportunity, and indeed unavoidable responsibility, to make a thorough re-evaluation of
the entire subject of capital punishment."
Under Furman, there are essentially three possible
legislative approaches to the reinstatement of the death
penalty-( 1) require imposition of the death penalty
as an automatic consequence of conviction for the
offense; (2) provide criteria for the discretionary
imposition of the penalty; or ( 3) a combination of
these approaches.
While strict mandatory death penalties, as they
were administered under the old common law, might
be considered valid under a technical reading of the
decision, it is uncertain whether they would survive
constitutional a,ttack. Chief Justice Burger in his dissenting opinion condemned such an approach in these
terms" If this [strict mandatory penalties] is the
only alternative that the legislatures can
safely pursue under today's ruling, I would
have preferred that the Court opt for total
abolition."
Common law mandatory death penalties are highly
objectionable on many grounds. In addition to humanLAW ALUMNI JOURNAL
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itarian considerations, experience has proven that
what is referred to as "jury nullification" takes place
under such common law penalties. This is where
juries simply refuse to convict regardless of the evidence when they consider death an unwarranted penalty in a particular case.
At the other end of the permissible legislative spectrum under Furman is the approach of providing
criteria to guide the discretionary imposition of the
death sentence. And by applying that discretion on
a state-wide level to remove the possibility of discrimination on a local level.
This is essentially the approach adopted by the
American Law Institute in the Model Penal Code.
The circumstances of aggravation and mitigation selected by the draftsmen of the Model Penal Code
were not intended to be exclusive. The Code provides
that the sentencing authority [review boards included]
should take into account the aggravating and mitigating circumstances enumerated . . . and any other
facts it deems relevant," and that the Court should
so instruct the jury when the issue is submitted to
a jury.
This leads me to a discussion of the capital punishment issue as it directly affects the citizens of the
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. As a member of the
Senate Judiciary Committe, I see the issue of capital
punishment under consideration by our committee in
the form of many bills representing many philosophies. Last year, only a matter of days after the
Furman decision was handed down, Philadelphia District Attorney Arlen Specter wrote to all members of
the State Legislature proposing a carefully drawn bill
which would reinstitute capital punishment consistent
with the guidelines imposed by the decision.
The bill which was written by Specter provides for
a mandatory death sentence for eight specific classes
of murder and provides for automatic review of a
conviction by the Board of Pardons which will be
provided with a set of aggravating and mitigating
circumstances to consider in their review.
When I introduced the Specter Bill in the Senate
a similar version was introduced in the State House
of Representatives by Representative Harry Comer
of Philadelphia.
Although the bill easily passed the House by a
vote of 157 to 38 on September 27th, the Senate did
not act before the 1972 session ended and so I reintroduced the bill in the current session of the State
Senate this past January.
In this session the bill is being co-sponsored by 18
of my colleagues.
Recently a death penalty bill was passed by the
House of Representatives by the overwhelming margin
of 172-20. That bill is presently in the Senate Judiciary Committee which is chaired by State Senator
Louis G. Hill of Philadelphia. The Judiciary Committee Chairman has already indicated that he will not
Summer 1973
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permit a aeath penalty bill to reach the floor of the
Senate until Governor Milton Shapp's Capital Punishment Study Commission has published its report. This
is expected to happen in early September.
Even then the road to final passage will not be
easy. Governor Shapp is vehemently opposed to the
bill and has vowed that there will be no executions
of convicted and sentenced criminals-however heinous and depraved their crimes-while he is Governor
of the Commonwealth.
While the legislature debates the overall issue of
capital punishment, I have introduced a bill which
would call for a referendum on the issue at the General Election to be held next November. I firmly believe that the issue of reinstitution of the death penalty
is properly one to be determined by democratic process. Senator Hill once again blocks it's passage.
Faced with the brutal and senseless killings of the
warden and deputy warden of Philadelphia's Holmesburg Prison it is clear to me that we must strengthen
our efforts to reinstitute capital punishment. Even the
outrageous position of Governor Shapp appeared to
be weakening. But reacting to the passage of capital
punishment legislation in the House the Shapp pendulum swung back again and he repeated his position
against the legislation.
The battle over reinstitution is not peculiar to Pennsylvania. Thus far fifteen states have reinstated the
death penalty for murder, while three of those states,
Arkansas, Georgia and Florida provide death sentences for other crimes as well.
Law enforcement officers throughout the United
States have taken steps to support reinstitution of the
death penalty.
The National Association of Attorneys General at
its December, 1972 meeting voted 32 to 2 to work for
capital punishment legislation. And the Attorneys
General have rated as excellent the chances of constitutional success that mandatory death sentences
would have in the following instances: 1. murder of
a police officer, corrections employee or fireman acting in the line of duty; 2. murder by a hired killer;
3. murder by malicious use or detonation of any bomb
or similar device; 4. murder by a person convicted
previously of murder; 5. murder by a person under
life imprisonment; 6. murder committed in the perpetration of a felony when the perpetrator had previously
been convicted of a felony; 7. murder resulting from
the hijacking of a public vehicle; 8. multiple slayings;
9. murder to prevent arrest or escape from legal custody; and 10. murder of a public official (assassination).
The Specter bill, as I stated previously calls for a
mandatory death sentence for eight classes of crime,
seven of which are contained in the proposals embraced by the NAAG above. The eight classes are:
1. The murder of a peace officer or fireman in the
17
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line of duty.
2. A contract murder committed for pecuniary
gain.
3. An assassination.
4. A murder committed by a defendant previously
convicted of first degree murder.
5. A murder committed by a defendant serving
a life sentence.
6. A murder committed during a felony where the
defendant had been previously convicted of a
felony.
7. A murder during a kidnapping.
8. A murder resulting from a hijacking of a public
vehicle.
As I previously stated such a conviction would
automatically be subject to review by the Board of
Pardons. This Board would have the authority, by a
majority vote, to reduce the sentence to life imprisonment after consideration of specific aggravating
and mitigating circumstances.
I feel that these provisions give the Specter Bill the
uniform application across the state which the Furman
decision demands.
Why do I feel so strongly that capital punishment
must be reinstated?
My experience as a former assistant district attorney, as a trial lawyer and as a legislator strongly suggests that criminals are deterred by the threat of the
death penalty.
Too many times while I was a prosecutor hardened
criminals openly admitted to me or my fellow prosecutors that they don't carry weapons because of their
fear of the death penalty.
Nowhere was this dramatized more clearly than
in the Brooklyn Chase Manhattan Bank holdup of
August 1972. The holdup man, while holding eight
hostages in the bank for many, many hours, told a reporter that if the cops stormed the bank, "I could kill.
I will shoot everyone in the bank. The Supreme Court
will let me get away with this. There's no death penalty. It is ridiculous. I can shoot everyone here then
throw my gun down and you can't put me in the
electric chair."
This is positive proof that the penalty, or lack
thereof, was very much on the mind of one armed
criminal, a potential killer. It is unreasonable to contend that the death penalty does not enter the minds
of some other killers. It is unrealistic to contend that
the death penalty does not, therefore, deter some
criminals.
I recognize very well that .the statistics of rising
crime and of increased violent crime rates do not
prove, with absolute certitude, that capital punishment is a deterrent to murder. Likewise, I would dispute the claim of the abolitionists that statistics prove
their positions.
I do submit that it is impossible to produce statistics that show the number of crimes which were not
18
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committed because of deterrent effect. Because we
have not as yet and most certainly never will have
criminals or potential criminals reporting to authorities the reasons that they did not commit a certain
crime.
1 strongly urge, if one potential murderer is deterred
annually and one innocent life spared, it justifies capital punishment.
I submit that past and future victims of crime are
deserving of our consideration, especially in view of
the fact that, beyond any question, our racial minorities and ghetto-dwellers are the principal victims of
violent crimes, including those crimes for which the
death penalty is provided.
I believe that many of those who advocate the abolition of the death penalty evidence a highly unrealistic and lofty disregard for the plight of the actual victims of countless murders and the safety of the potential victims of those who will kill in the future.
I believe that it is imperative that the death penalty
be returned to law enforcement as a deterrent tool, not
because I hold in low regard the life of any individual.
I introduced this legislation because I hold human life
in the highest regard and because I want the prosecutors to have, at their disposal, every tool to protect the
lives of decent, law abiding citizens.
I firmly believe that the death penalty is a deterrent
to crime. I hope that you will agree with me and urge
your legislators to vote for the passage of this proposal.

Speaker
(Continued from page 5)
abolished the Death Penalty. It didn't happen. 7 If deterrence were effective, there would be more killings
of guards by lifers in abolitionist states. That didn't
happen either. s
If there were mysterious, uncounted, unidentifiable
would-be killers held back from striking because they
feared the chair-proof of their existence would have
shown up in the studies. They didn't show because
they didn't exist. So those who argue deterrence-now
with the heavy burden of proof placed on them--can
neither support their burden nor explain the evidence
directly against them.
How can we allow the return of a primitive practice that so demeans us all on such a flimsy basis as
discredited logic or a handful of unverified subjective
reports?
The ConstitutionThe effect of the action of the United States Supreme Court last year was to shift the burden of proof
to the advocates of the Death Penalty. The result of
the Court's decisions was to render unconstitutional
every statute allowing a discretionary death sentence
to be imposed. This is the clear import of the Furman
case. There were nine separate opinions written-one
LAW ALUMNI JOURNAL
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by each member of the Court. But, although each of
the five majority opinions differed in breadth and in
scope, all five Justices are in solid agreement that discretionary death penalties are unconstitutional. n
The Supreme Court's order list, issued contemporaneously with the Furman decision, establishes beyond dispute that the discretionary death penalty has
been eliminated. In a single day, the Court summarily
vacated death sentences based on some 26 state statutes, including Pennsylvania's, involving 117 additional felons.l o
Thus, no matter how the death sentence was determined, if it involved the exercise of discretion, the
United States Supreme Court found it to be offensive
to the Constitution, and overturned it. Whether death
sentencing was dependent upon the discretion of judge
or jury, and without regard to the form of the statutes
conferring such discretion, the Court rejected it.l 1
And the Court in its present term consistently continues this practice and vacates any such death
sentences.1 2
Despite the plea that particular crimes were so atrocious as to specially merit execution of the convict,
the Court's treatment of these cases recognized no differences in the reach and effect of the Eighth Amendment. The nature of the offenses or the particular
circumstances of the cases were not significant in the
context of the prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment. Many of the 120 defendants whose death
sentences were vacated had been convicted of exceptionally brutal murders , J :: felony-murders, 14 mass
murders, 1 " as well as cases involving the murder of
law enforcement officers,16
With this background of wholesale judicial disapproval of existing death penalty provisions, some proponents have nonetheless sought to construct a statute impervious to constitutional attack. Although the
exact dimensions of the legislative proposals are presently unclear, their general form is predictable. Basically, they will call for a mandatory death penalty in
enumerated and defined categories of killing.
Predicting success before the Supreme Court for
such proposals is engaging in a perilous game. Some
proposals are either based on hints and hunches, or
upon a cynical belief that members of the Court will
change their minds because of public pressure or that
the composition of the Court will be changed.
For whatever reason, an instant legend has sprung
up declaring that a mandatory Death Penalty-totally
without discretion-would be constitutionally permissible. This belief is usually based upon the concurring
opinions of Justices White and Stewart in the Furman
case. These two Justices stopped short of the finding
of per se unconstitutionality, but held that the unequal
application of the penalty was constitutionally defective. As Justice Stewart wrote:
I simply conclude that the Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendments cannot tolerate the
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infliction of a sentence of death under legal
systems that permit this unique penalty to
be so wantedly and freakishly imposed. 1 7
Or, as Justice White wrote:
. . . A jury, in its own discretion, and
without violating its trust or any statutory
policy, may refuse to impose the death penalty no matter what the circumstances of the
crime. Legislative "policy" is thus necessarily defined not by what juries and judges
do in exercising the discretion so regularly
conferred upon them. In my judgment what
was done in these cases violated the Eighth
Amendment. 1 s
It must be emphasized that the failure of Justices
White and Stewart to hold the Death Penalty to be
unconstitutional per se in no way allows the inference
that they believe it is not unconstitutional per se. They
simply didn't reach the issue. 1 v
It is perhaps relevant to note that, after Furman,
the first efforts of the Death Penalty proponents were
to argue that the Pennsylvania provision was still viable
because it was not arbitrarily, selectively or discriminatorily applied. But the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
relying on Furman, has stated:
... the United States Supreme Court recently held that the imposition of the death
penalty under statutes such as the one pursuant to which the death penalty was imposed
upon appellant is violative of the Eighth and
and Fourteenth Amendments. Accordingly,
appellant's sentence of death may not now
be imposed. 20
And the Philadelphia District Attorney's office efforts to present statistical evidence to refute the unfairness argument-claiming that there has been no
discrimination under Pennsylvania statutes-has been
thwarted by the Supreme Courts of Pennsylvania and
the United States. 21
Even as two Justices who voted in the majority did
not reach the issue of a mandatory Death Penalty, two
dissenting Justices cast strong doubt on its ultimate
constitutionality. Writing of his "distate, antipathy, and,
indeed, abhorence, for the death penalty, with all its
aspects of physical distress and fear and of moral
judgment exercised by finite mind", 2 2 Justice Blackmun
warned against the mandatory penalty stating:
This approach, it seems to me, encourages
legislation that is regressive and of an antique
mold, for it eliminates the element of mercy
in the imposition of punishment. I thought
we had passed beyond that point in our
criminology long ago. 2 3
Chief Justice Burger also expressed strong opposition to mandatory death sentences:
It seems remarkable to me that with our
basic trust in lay jurors as the keystone in
our system of criminal justice, it should now

-. .
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be suggested that we take the most sensitive
and important of all decisions away from
them. 1 could more easily be persuaded that
mandatory sentences of death, without the
intervening and ameliorating impact of Jay
jurors, are so arbitrary and doctrinaire that
they violate the Constitution. The very infrequency of death penalties imposed by jurors
attests their cautious and discriminating reservation of that penalty for the most extreme
cases. I had thought that nothing was clearer
in history, as we noted in McGautha one
year ago than the American abhorrence of
"the common-law rule imposing a mandatory
death sentence on all convicted murderers."
... the 19th century movement away from
mandatory death sentences marked an enlightened introduction of flexibility into the
sentencing process. It recognized that individual culpability is not always measured
by the category of the crime committed. This
change in sentencing practice was created
by the Court as a humanizing development.~~

Thus, a careful reading of the nine opinions in
Furman, can give little comfort to those who see a
Supreme Court embracing the mandatory death sentence as a constitutionally viable alternative to those
statutes presently voided. A solid majority stands in
their way-whatever way they turn.
Some proponents of restoration of the death penalty urge that adoption of a mandatory death penalty
would have the useful effect of forcing defendants to
waive trial by jury by entering guilty pleas to the lesser
offense. Plea bargaining to facilitate the administration
of criminal justice is an issue that divides prosecutors.
Its proponents, who argue that the death penalty
should be mandated by statute so that prosecutors
could extract a bargained-for plea, run the grave risk
of imposing a constitutionally fatal defect.
In 1968, the United States Supreme Court held that
the death penalty provision of the federal kidnapping
statute was an "impermissible burden on the exercise
of a constitutional right"2 5
. . . the defendant who abandons the
right to contest his guilt before a jury is
assured that he cannot be executed; the defendant ingenious enough to seek a jury acquittal stands forwarned that, if the jury
finds him guilty and does not wish to spare
his life, he will die . . . the inevitable effect
of any such provision is, of course, to discourage assertion of the Fifth Amendment
right not to plead guilty, and to deter exercise of the Sixth Amendment right to demand a jury trial. 2 6
The adoption of a mandatory death penalty statute
to force bargaining for a lesser penalty would plunge
20
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us into the Catch-22 world where only those who insisted on their innocence and demanded their constitutional protections could be put to death.
This the Constitution and the Supreme Court would
not allow.
There are, of course, other basic reasons why a
mandatory death sentence would be both historically
regressive and constitutionally untenable. As the Supreme Court recognized the year before the Furman
case, the centuries-old history of the death penalty
reflected a distinct rebellion against the mandatory
sentence.27 Reforms embraced attempts to limit certain crimes to be punishable by death. The categories
were defined, and crimes falling within those categories brought a mandatory death sentence. But:
... jurors on occasion took the law into
their own hands in cases which were "willful, deliberate, and premeditated" in any
view of that phrase, but which nevertheless
were clearly inappropriate for the death penalty. In such cases they simply refused to
convict of the capital offense .... in order to
meet the problem of jury nullification, legislators did not try, as before, to define further
the definition of capital homicides. Instead
they adopted the method of forthrightly
granting juries the discretion which they had
been exercising in fact. 2 ~
It was this built-in jury discretion which was found
to be obnoxious to the Constitution a year later in
Furman.
There cannot be a valid mandatory death penalty.
The essential discretionary character of our criminal
justice system carries the seeds of constitutional selfdestruction. As Chief Justice Burger said in his
Furman dissent:
. . . unless the Court in McGautha misjudged the experience of history, there is little
reason to believe that sentencing standards
in any form will substantially alter the discretionary character of the prevailing system of
sentencing in capital cases. 2 n
And Mr. Justice Douglas wrote as part of the majority in the same case:
Any law which is nondiscriminatory on its
face may be applied in such a way as to violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Yick Wo v. Hopkins,
118 U.S. 356. Such conceivably might be the
fate of a mandatory death penalty, where
equal or lesser sentences were imposed on the
elite, as harsher one on the minorities or
members of the lower castes.::; 0
Some proponents of the mandatory death penalty
recognize, and even rely on, the essential discretionary
nature of the system. Acknowledging that a mandatory
penalty could do severe injustice, they are content to
rely on the pardoning powers to ameliorate the built-in
LAW ALUMNI JOURNAL
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harshness. This action converts the process from mandatory to discretionary. Even before a case could reach
the Pardons Board, there are numerous incidents where
discretion could attach-before the appellate courts,
in rulings of a trial judge, in the process of "jury nullification", in grand jury deliberations, and at preliminary hearings. But it is prosecutorial discretion - at
the outset of a criminal case-that presents the greatest chance for abuse and thus brings the greatest opportunity for constitutional rejection. As Professor
Bedau has recently written:
... mandatory death penalties do not eliminate discretion. They shift it from the trial
jury to the prosecutor's office. Instead of leaving it up to the jury whether to sentence to
death or to prison, mandatory death penalties allow the prosecutor to decide whether to
indict for a capital crime or for a lesser
offense, in order to reduce the risk of the
jury's refusal to convict. There is no reason
to believe that such discretion would be exercised without bias, especially in death
penalty cases, where aroused community
sentiment and possible political advantage
are involved. It is very unlikely that the
Supreme Court would allow such discretion
to prosecutors when it has denied comparable
discretion to juries.::~ 1
The danger of unbridled executive discretion is not
abstract. We read of it daily. Although not always
immediately visible and often hidden from exposure,
discriminatory discretion does occur. It would be
neither unknown or unbelievable to learn that a
prosecutor, in a case where there existed prima facie
evidence of homicide, nonetheless refused to press
charges or moved to dismiss the case because friends
were involved or law enforcement could be injured.
However worthy the motive, such untenable prosecutorial discrimination has occurred, is wrong and will
render any mandatory death penalty unconstitutional.

Not in PennsylvaniaEven if there were a possibility that a mandatory
death penalty could survive constitutional attack, we
should let others test it first. Pennsylvania has led the
fight against the death penalty since the efforts of
William Penn in 1682. :-1 2 A century later, in 1794,
Pennsylvania was the first to reduce capital crimes to
one. 3 a In 1834, the Commonwealth abolished public
executions. ::4 We should not profane this proud history
of commitment to the value of human life by rushing
to follow other states who have enacted death penalties.
From a purely practical concern for the administration of criminal justice, we should wait. If we were
to reinstate the death sentence, we could anticipate a
significant increase in the cost of the administration of
justice, and an unwelcome clogging of already congested courts. For it costs more to execute a man
than to maintain him in prison for the rest of his life. 3 5
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And because execution is both extreme and final, legal
counsel invoke every procedural safeguard, every right
of appeal, and every opening for collateral attack to
save their clients from death. The inevitable result
is congestion.
The mandatory death penalty will reach the United
States Supreme Court. The best course, both economical and prudent, would be for Pennsylvania to wait,
observe; and, if any statute survives constitutional
scrutiny, consider eliminating it.

Other PrioritiesProponents of the death penalty act in good faith
and with honest concern for the protection of innocent
human life. But there are other, more demanding ways
to bring this about.
The surest deterrent to capital crime would be the
certain knowledge that such criminals will be quickly
caught, swiftly tried, certainly convicted, and imprisoned
for life. If we really wish to protect human life, let's
turn our attention and change our priorities to paying
our police more, improving the quality of our law
enforcement process, speeding trials and making a
life sentence the certain result of murder. It boggles all
but the most sophisticated mind to see advocates of a
mandatory death penalty, purportedly designed to protect the lives of prison guards, tolerating budget cuts
that mean fewer guards and can only deny them the
added protection they must have.
And if we really care about protecting human life,
there are other priorities too that have a far greater
potential for saving lives.
In the last full year covered by FBI reports, some
11,600 people were shot to death-and the vast majority were in cases where the death penalty would
never have been applied , :l H and thus never could have
been a deterrent. Take away firearms, and thousands
of deaths could be prevented.
In Pennsylvania alone last year, 2,333 people were
killed in highways accidents. About half involved drunk
drivers. Take away licenses and keep drunk drivers off
the road-and more than a thousand lives could be
saved in this state alone next year.
There are other ways to honor human life-better
ways than to kill to do it honor. We can throw society's
weight behind alternatives to abortion. We can end the
indiscriminate mass killing of war. We can improve
health care, attack poverty, reduce infant mortality.
All of these suggestions then can save and value
human life. By reordering our priorities-by avoiding
war, improving the quality of life, making our highways
safe, adopting strict gun control, and forging a truly
effective and efficient criminal justice system-we can
save countless thousands of human lives.
Against that potential, a return to the death penalty
seems small and mean. Measured against the chance
to do so much good-it seems intolerably wasteful
for the Legislature to be so preoccupied with a device
of such little application.
21
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It was our evolving sense of decency that brought us
to the point of abandoning the death penalty. It would
be a tragic denial of this beautiful evolution were
we to return to that demeaning and bestial practice.
So-because we don't need the death penalty, because it doesn't deter, because it can't be constitutional,
because of Pennsylvania's heritage, and because protection of human life is more important-we should
not regress.
Surely we can be better than that.
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Specter
(Continued from page 6)

fenders charged with non-violent crimes and was aimed
at cutting into the court backlog and thereby freeing
court time for the trial of repeaters and violent criminals. It was inten9ed to divert persons from the
criminal process to treatment alternatives before they
fell into a pattern of criminal activity, by combining
the incentive of a fresh start with the threat of renewed
prosecution if the new start was not taken.
The program has been so successful that the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania by order of May 24,
1972, adopted Criminal Procedural Rules 175 to 185
which provided the procedures for an Accelerated Rehabilitative Disposition. By comment to those Rules,
the Committee noted that "ARD" is based upon the
presently existing practice in Philadelphia and that its
stated purpose is to eliminate the need for lengthy
motions, trials and other court proceedings in cases
which are relatively minor or which involve s_ocial or
behavior problems which can best be solved by programs and treatment rather than punishment.
The District Attorney's Office employs a full-time
assistant district attorney and supporting paralegal and
clerical personnel to screen all cases initiated by arrest
to determine appropriateness for the ARD Program.
Exceptional cases and requests by defense counsel for
reconsideration are specially reviewed by the chief of
the ARD Unit. Upon being accepted, both the defendant and the complainant are advised of participation in the program by letter. If the terms of the
program are agreeable to both, the case is listed for
aa ARD hearing before Judge Hoffman who, after a
brief absence, is again sitting as the hearing judge.
Cases are heard two days each week. At these informal hearings, an assistant district attorney, defense
attorney and representatives from local non-profit soLAW ALUMNI JOURNAL
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cial service agencies, join with the judge in appropriately disposing of the cases.
With the help of an LEAA grant, my Office has
contracted with HELP, Inc., a non-profit drug treatment and referral agency to provide rehabilitative and
supervisory services for ARD cases. In addition, this
grant provides for the hiring of four probation officers
to assist the court with the supervisory functions.
[n addition, as the program has evolved, many
community organizations have sent representatives to
the hearings to accept assignments in fashioning specific rehabilitation programs. The Philadelphia General
Hospital Drug Rehabilitation Clinic is on hand to aid
the addicts. Eagleville Hospital and Rehabilitation Center, specializing in treating alcoholics, is a cooperating
agency. The Center for Studies in Sexual Deviance is
available to render supervisory service when the probation involves a problem in that area of expertise. The
Jewish Family Service, the Public Defender's Social
Service, the Philadelphia Psychiatric Center and other
agencies have also voluntered support.
In the first six months of 1973, the ARD program
disposed of 1,616 cases while a companion program
for drunk drivers disposed of 413 cases in the three
month period from March 21, 1973 to June 21, 1973.
In 1971, 1,852 cases were disposed, of which 14.7 %
were outright dismissals and in 1972, 4,127 cases were
disposed, of which 9.1 % were dismissals.
In 1971 the rearrest rate from all cases involving
auto larceny, burglary, driving vehicle intoxicated, larceny except auto, minor assault, narcotic drug violations and weapons offenses was 22.7% and in 1972
it was 16.5%. For ARD cases, however, it was only
16.8% in 1971 and 7.7% in 1972.
ARD

DEFENDANT DISPOSITIONS
Auto Larceny .
Burglary .
........ .. ...
Driving while Intoxicated
Larceny (except auto) .
Minor Assault .
Narcotic Drug Laws .
Weapons
All Others
Total

1971
(Feb.-Dec.)
148
259
8
167
133
806
118
213
1852

1972

Total

305
316
348
327
684
869
174
1104
4127

453
575
356
494
817
1675
292
1317
5979

(7.6%)
(9.6%)
(6.0%)
(8.3%)
(13.7%)
(28.0%)
(4.9%)
(21.9%)
(100.0%)

DISMISSAL RATES
1972

1971
Disp./Dism.
35
Auto Larceny .
148
Burglary
259
47
8
3
Driving while Intoxicated .
31
Larceny (except auto) .
167
35
Minor Assault ............ 133
70
Narcotic Drug Laws .
806
118
20
Weapons
............
1639 241
Total

%

Dism.
26.3%
18.2%
37.5%
18.6%
23.7%
8.7%
17.0%
14.7%

Disp./Dism.
305
54
29
316
13
348
327
40
684 164
869
56
174
31
3023 387

%
Dism.
17.7%
9.2%
3.7%
12.2%
24.0%
6.4%
17.8%
9.1%

Some Case Histories
David Smith's long red hair fell almost to his
shoulders when he appeared for his pre-indictment
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probation hearing. It was hard to tell his age behind
his bushy red mustache until a review of the police
record showed that he was only 20. The charge on
the police blotter was a serious one: illegal possession
of narcotics. Smith's case is similar to thousands of
prosecutions which are now parading through the criminal courts in the United States.
Two plain-clothed police officers saw him smoking
an unusual looking cigaret in yellow paper. According to the police report, the officers believed the cigaret
was marijuana. An arrest and search followed, disclosing eight more cigarets in Smith's trousers. The
police analysis showed all contained marijuana. David
Smith had no prior criminal record.
This arrest threatened the rest of Smith's life. A
conviction would block him from a possible career in
law, medicine or accounting. On any application for
a sensitive job, David Smith would be called upon
to disclose his police record. Perhaps most important
of all, he would carry the scar of a criminal conviction
in his own mind for as long as he lived.
The traditional handling of a case like David
Smith's in our criminal courts left much to be desired.
After arrest and preliminary hearing, the transcript
would be forwarded to the grand jury. Indictment
would be automatic. Smith would then have been required to appear five weeks later for an arraignment,
when a trial date would be set. Because of the crowded
criminal docket, the case would be listed half a dozen
times or more before a courtroom, judge, prosecuting
attorney, defense lawyer, defendant and witness could
be simultaneously assembled.
Defendants like Smith would doubtless be convicted-unless the evidence of the marijuana cigarets
was excluded at trial on the ground that the police
lacked probable cause to make a constitutional search
and seizure. After that lengthy process, Smith would
doubtless be placed on probation. In big city courts,
district attorneys have great difficulty persuading
judges to send repeaters to jail, even where crimes of
violence are involved. It would be a foregone conclusion that a young · man like David Smith would be
placed on probation, and that would be the proper
disposition.
The results of this traditional approach are disastrous. The defendant walks away from the courtroom wondering what it was all about. Why was he
arrested, indicted, arraigned and brought to City Hall
for six trial dates on such an insignificant matter?
Even the judge recognized it was insignificant, because
he let him go. The police are frustrated. What is the
point in making such arrests, commanded by the state
penal code, when the judge consistently puts the defendant on probation? The judicial system buckles
under the onerous administrative burden of trials on
such lesser offenses, leaving the courts little time for
the serious cases. Conservatively, the exercise in futility
attendant to David Smith's charge would· cost the tax23
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payers about $1,000.
Under the new system of pre-indictment probation,
however the complex prosecution chain is broken before indictment. While efforts are now being made to
screen out some cases even before arrest, the most
logical point of interception once the arrest has been
made is immediately before the grand jury hears the
evidence. An experienced district attorney reviews
cases which have been held by a committing magistrate for action by the grand jury; and the prosecutor
screens out the lesser, non-violent charges where the
defendant has no prior conviction or only minimal
police contacts. Those cases are placed on a special
list for Accelerated Rehabilitative Disposition.
The hearing proceeds like a meeting instead of a
trial. The clash and clamor of the courtroom are absent. The formalism of the robed judge on a pedestal
is gone. There is no witness chair or defendant's dock.
No witnesses are called, although notice is sent to the
private complainants to give them an opportunity to
be present. When the defendant sits at the table next
to the assistant district attorney and across from the
judge, he can see that there are no demons out to get
him. Some of the defendants have openly expressed
surprise that they were being treated in such a sensible
way. This eyeball-to-eyeball confrontation similarly
gives the judge fresh insight into the personality and
problem of the defendant. The focus shifts to what
should be done to help this defendant stay out of
trouble in the future.
At the start of the session, the hearing room is usually crowded with 50 or 60 people, awaiting the call
of their cases. Most of the faces are black or young
or both. The younger defendants are frequently accompained by their parents. The mother or father
usually appears much more anxious about the whole
affair than the youthful defendants, whose faces frequently reflect an open skepticism about what the system is going to do to them next.
The district attorney quietly calls each case in turn.
No longer is the gravel voice of the court bailiff heard
with the bellowing tone: "The Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania versus John Defendant," which begins
the formalism in the regular criminal courtroom. After
the defendant and his attorney are seated at the conference table, the assistant district attorney introduces
himself and the judge and then proceeds to explain
the operation of the system. A court stenographer
records the district attorney's explanation that: (1) the
program gives the defendant a chance to earn a full
discharge if he completes it satisfactorily; (2) should
the defendant violate the terms of probation by getting
into trouble with the law, he can be indicted and prosecuted on the original charge; (3) his agreement to
participate in the program involves a waiver of his
right to a speedy trial, so far as any delays attributed
to this program are concerned. When the defendant
indicates his understanding of the program and his
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willingness to partiCipate, the court reporter takes no
further notes until the judge is ready to announce the
disposition of the case.
Nothing said by the defendant can be used against
him in any later proceeding. That was the setting when
David Smith sat down at the conference table after
his case was called for ARD.
His face was impassive. The district attorney opened
a slender file and quietly read the police version showing Smith in possession of nine marijuana cigarets.
The one-page police report took less than two minutes
to read. Smith's attorney said it was all true. The judge
then asked Smith why he started smoking marijuana.
Smith replied that he had taken it up for kicks. Under
questioning by the judge, Smith acknowledged that he
understood that he could be subjected to an extensive
prison sentence up to five years for possession of
marijuana. A tough but unstuffy lecture followed, with
the judge informing Smith that he was being given a
chance to clean the slate of this youthful indiscretion,
providing he behaved himself during a two-year period
of probation.
Smith breathed a sigh of relief as he left the conference table, and so did the criminal justice system.
A case which could have tied up a judge, police officers,
witnesses, attorneys and the defendant for hours or
days had been concluded in a very few minutes. And
it was a very sensible way to handle the matter. Had
it gone through the old procedure, it would have likely
ended in probation. But the case could have scarred
both Smith and the court system.
Another typical case involved the charge of receiving stolen goods against Herbert White. White had
been observed by police attempting to start a stolen
car, while a second man stood in front of the automobile with the hood open. White claimed that he was
merely helping out a friend by taking the automobile
for repairs. After police filed a charge of receiving
stolen goods, White was held for action of the grand
jury under nominal bail.
Under the old system, this case probably would
have dragged through the courts for more than a year
for the same result of one year's probation.
Raymond Robinson presented a pathetic picture
when his case was called for a pre-indictment probation
hearing.
He had been arrested after a homeowner returned
to her home at about 6 P.M. one evening finding
Robinson in a dazed condition inside the house.
Robinson was charged with burglary, forcible entry,
vagrancy and breach of the peace, and was committed
to prison when he could not raise $1500 bail.
At the pre-indictment probation hearing, Robinson
explained that he had been beaten up earlier that day
and had wandered around in a daze not knowing
where he was. His claim that he had no intention to
steal anything was confirmed by the fact that nothing
LAW ALUMNI JOURNAL
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was taken from the house. On these facts, it was clear
that he should not have been charged with burglary.
The only charge supported by the evidence was forcible unlawful entry.
For a 4 7-year-old man with no prior record, the
seven weeks in jail was more than sufficient. He was
placed on probation for one year in a hearing which
focused on the available social services which could
help him. Had he spent several months in jail awaiting
trial in the normal course of events, he would certainly
have received no tougher sentence from a judicial system which repeatedly places recidivist burglars on
probation.
Edith Carter was a 49-year-old prostitute. When she
sat down at the conference table for her pre-indictment
probation hearing, everyone present wondered how
such an ugly woman could succeed in her chosen
profession. But some prostitution cases are like that.
She was a freelance, casual operator.
The brief police report stated that she had struck
up a conversation with a police officer in Philadelphia's
Chinatown and had propositioned him. They then went
to a local hotel, where they had a drink before checking into a room. After she had completely disrobed
and accepted $25, the undercover officer arrested her
for prostitution, solicitation to commit sodomy, accepting bawdy money, and immoral practices. Notwithstanding the multiple charges, it boiled down to a
prostitution case.
Although she had three prior arrests but no convictions for prostitution, a jail sentence would have
served no useful purpose. The one-year probation,
which she received in this program, was doubtless the
same sentence she would have gotten had her case
traveled the tortuous regular prosecution path through
multiple listings over many months.
Several checks had been stolen from the home of a
Merion doctor. Mary Ann Jackson , 46, attempted to
cash one of these checks for $335 in a business establishment. The proprietor became suspicious and
called the police. The check was traced to a theft
at the doctor's residence.
Based on the nature of the charge and the fact that
Mary Ann Jackson had no prior criminal record, this
case was selected for the pre-indictment program. In
normal course, the doctor was notified about the District Attorney's intention to handle the case in the new
way. He responded as follows: "In respect to your
letter about Mary Ann Jackson, I heartily approve
placing her upon pre-indictment probation. The entire
program seems like an excellent idea, and perhaps will
be at least one step toward doing something about the
disgraceful backlog in our criminal courts."
ARD allows less serious cases involving first offenders to be diverted from the traditional criminal
justice system.
The result is a saving in time for all concernedSummer 1973
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the time of police as witnesses at trial, of prosecutors
and public defenders, of judges and jurors. The police
are free to investigate and the prosecutors are free to
try cases involving crimes of violence and judges and
juries are free to hear and decide them.
Everyone wins. The police, the prosecutors, the
judiciary and, most importantly, the public.

Pollak
(Continued from page 7)

could do no other than nod assent, but all the while
I was remembering the unbroken string of Cs which
had marked my progress through law school."
I have said that speaking words of welcome and
congratulation to newly minted law school graduates
entering the profession is a happy task, and so it is.
But it is not without ambiguity. Am I to say to
you, as was said by the speaker at commencement at
Florida Technological University last Friday, "In the
whole history of the world, in all of the nations of the
world, there has never been a time I would rather be
a graduate than in the year 1973 in the United States
of America"? I'm afraid that neither the substance
nor the style of that communique persuades me. Notwithstanding that it comes to us with the imprimatur
of the President of the United States, it is, in my judgment, inoperative.
Most of us have come to the law not simply to
make a living-not that this is an objective to be
scorned, but there are broader boulevards to middleand-upper-middle classness-but rather because law is
in our country the preeminently public profession. We
have known since Tocqueville's time that lawyers are
the shapers and monitors-in Tocqueville's terms, the
natural aristocrats-of American democracy. We have
hoped it was true in our own time. Notwithstanding
war, racial strife, the blight of poverty, the wasting of
cities, the alienation of the young and the anonymity
of the old, the clouding of water and air, and the littering and pillaging and paving of our green and pleasant land-notwithstanding all these, we looked to law
as the way and means to fulfill our democratic promises: The law of Brown v. Board of Education; the
law of the Atomic Test Ban and SALT; the law which
provides funds for schools and medical care, or bars
discrimination, or strengthens the franchise.
But five years ago-the brutal year when Martin
Luther King and Robert Kennedy were killed-law
became "law and order." The American people were
told by a lawyer who sought the Presidency: "The
Miranda and Escobedo decisions of the High Court
have had the effect of seriously hamstringing the peace
forces in our society and strengthening the criminal
forces." The lawyer was elected. His regard for the
High Court was soon evidenced by the fact that two
of his nominees for Associate Justice were rejected by
25
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the Senate-and of the second nominee the lawyerSenator who had charge of the nomination on the
Administration's behalf had this to say: "Even if he
were mediocre, there are a lot of mediocre judges and
people and lawyers and they are entitled to a little
representation, aren't they?" A year later, in 1971, another lawyer-Senator, the then Chairman of the Republican National Committee, gave a speech which
contained further revealing insights into the Administration's attitude towards law and legal institutions:
A hard-hitting Attorney General, John
Mitchell, is using every weapon in the lawenforcement arsenal to bring gangsters to
justice and deter crime in the streets. Incidentally, just the other day, we had another
forceful reminder of the difference between
our Republican Attorney General and the
man he succeeded in office. Ramsey Clark,
LBJ's Attorney General, announced that he
was taking on one of the Berrigan Brothers
as a client. No wonder extremists had a heyday under the Democrats, when they knew
that the chief law-enforcement official of
the federal government was a left-leaning
marshmallow like Ramsey Clark!
Today we are witnessing the curious results. A responsible Attorney General is
fighting the bomb-throwers and advocates of
lawlessness in our midst, while an irresponsible former Attorney General, Democrat
Ramsey Clark, is acting as lawyer for accused conspirators!
You couldn't ask for a clearer example
of what is wrong with the leadership of the
Democratic Party today-or what is right
with the Nixon's Administration's efforts to
fight crime and violence.
There is another view of the lawyer's role, and
under that view Ramsey Clark, as a private lawyer,
might reasonably have supposed that representing one
accused of crime, who sought his professional aid, was
a matter of professional responsibility, even when the
accused was Philip Berrigan-just as, some years before, when he was Attorney General, Ramsey Clark
had found it to be his professional responsibility to
his client, the United States, to prosecute both the
Berrigan Brothers on other charges. But that is a view
of the lawyer's role which apparently did not commend itself to the lawyer-Senator-Chairman of the
Republican National Committee. It is, after all, an
old-fashioned view, and one which, like the Miranda
rule, runs the risk of "seriously hamstringing the
peace forces in our society and strengthening the criminal forces."
Rejecting old-fashioned notions, the present Administration seems to have been imbued with an up-todate, efficiency-oriented (if not strict constructionist)
view of law and legal institutions. Particularly that
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view has characterized a number of those who were
recently in or close to the White House-men to
whom there was delegated major authority to implement the President's Constitutional obligation to " take
Care that the Laws be faithfully executed"-and it
seems to have led them to low-water mark.
Even though we don't yet know the full story, we
probably know enough to document a plausible argument that our system-the system within which we
lawyers have been taught to work-is bankrupt. Indeed , a brief supporting just that thesis has already
been written. Permit me to read excerpts from Henry
Adams' observations of events a century ago-when
1ay Gould, in 1869, tried to corner gold , and Washington was alive with conjecture as to who, in high
official station, had acquiesced in the calamitous gold
conspiracy:
Although the fault lay somewhere on the
Administration , and could lie nowhere else,
the trail always faded and died out at the
point where any member of the Administration became visible. . . . With the conventional air of assumed confidence, every
one in public assured everyone else that the
President himself was the savior of the situation, and in private assured each other that
if the President had not been caught this
time, he was s~re to be trapped the next, for
the ways of Wall Street were dark and
and double . . . .
... That Grant should have fallen, within
six months, into such a morass ... rendered
the outlook for the next four years-probably eight-possibly twelve-mysterious, or
frankly opaque, to a young man who had
hitched his wagon , as Emerson told him, to
the star of reform. The country might outlive
it, but not he. The worst scandals of the
eighteenth century were relatively harmless
by the side of this, which smirched executive,
judiciary, banks, corporate systems, professions, and people, all the great active forces
of society, in one dirty cesspool of vulgar
corruption. . . .
. . . For satirists or comedians, the study
was rich and endless, and they exploited its
corners with happy results. . . . Rich and
poor joined in throwing contempt on their
own representatives. Society laughed a vague
and meaningless derision over its own
failure ....
... The political dilemma was as clear in
1870 as it was likely to be in 1970. The system of 1789 had broken down, and with it
the eighteenth-century fabric of a priori, or
moral principles. Politicians had tacitly given
it up . . . .
America has produced few people of Henry Adams'
LAW ALUMNI JOURNAL
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brilliance. But much of his power lay in his relentless
didacticism. He did not suffer fools gladly, nor knaves
either: but if he had found none about him, he might
well have created them (himself somewhat ostentatiously included) to make his points. And one of the
chief points, for this chronicler and prophet of doom,
was that the presuppositions of democracy were humbug--or, at best, sentimental anachronisms unrelated
to the vast impersonal forces hurrying history to the
deluge: "The political dilemma," you recall Adams
saying, "was as clear in 1870 as it was likely to be in
1970. The system of 1789 had broken down, and with
it the eighteenth century fabric of a priori, or moral,
principles."
But people in 1789 were no more virtuous than a
century later, or a century later still; nor did the
Framers perceive them to be. Self-interest as the dominant rule of life was the Framers' forthrightly accepted
premise: " ... [W]hat is government itself," asked the
author of the fifty-first Federalist paper, " but the greatest of all reflections on on human nature? If men were
angels, no government would be necessary."
Moreover, the events of 1869-70, which Adams
depicted as cataclysmic, hardly seem insurmountable
to our nineteen-seventies' view. We have learned that
government can deal with wrongdoers worse than
Gould and his colleagues-for example, those whom
Franklin Roosevelt called "private malefactors of
great wealth," and also those greater miscreants, the
public malefactors, who, like Governors Faubus and
Barnett, in the late nineteen-fifties and early 'sixties,
warred on the Constitution from state sanctuaries, or
who, like Secretary Fall in Harding's time or Judge
Manton a generation ago, used high national office to
commit high crimes. If today's miscreants are more
numerous and more powerful than their predecessors,
there seem happily to continue to be great reservoirs or
countervailing power in the checking institutions which
we have prudently maintained-the press; the Congress;
and, most notably and enduringly, the courts, and
especially the Supreme Court. Indeed, I think it particularly bears remembering that the Court, speaking
in the firm accents of Mr. Justice Powell, and without
dissent, rejected the claim of Attorney General Mitchell
that the President has inherent power to engage in
domestic wiretapping without a warrant: "We recognize, as we have before, the constitutional basis of the
President's domestic security role, but we think it must
be exercised in a manner compatible with the Fourth
Amendment."
In short, I think the debacle we are witnessing is
manageable, and only manageable, within the framework of our free institutions. Indeed, provided we
stick fast to our resolve that a Mitchell or a Stans or
a Haldemann or an Erlichman is as fully entitled to
due process as an Ellsberg, we will prove anew the
strength of those institutions.
We learn inuch about our institutions from the perceptions-whether accurate or skewed-of those who,
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like Henry Adams, observe the human condition. But
to make our institutions work we also need the more
commonplace skills of participation. We need, for
example, people like Henry's grandfather: a man of
high ability and intelligence, albeit an intelligence
more pedestrian than Henry's. But John Quincy
Adams had no compelling vocational need for Henry's
dazzling array of intuitions and syntheses. He was,
after all, only a lawyer. (And it should in all fairness
be acknowledged parenthetically that in his private
practice John Quincy Adams was so faithless to the
precepts of the profession, as enunciated in 1971 by
the Senator-Chairman of the Republican National Committee, that he represented the slaves who mutinied on
the Spanish schooner Amistad: but perhaps that can
be written off to bad early training-after all, his
lawyer-father had once represented an alleged smuggler
named John Hancock.) John Quincy Adams devoted
most of his professional skills to public service, notwithstanding that he was as pessimistic as Henry would
later be about the viability of the union. Beaten for
reelection to the Presidency in 1828, John Quincy
Adams saw in his successor, Andrew Jackson, much
of what Henry was later to see in Grant. The events
of Jackson's first term die;! nothing to reassure the
former President. In 1832, he noted that he had once
supposed "that the foederative union was to last for
ages. I now disbelieve its duration for twenty years,
and doubt its continuance for five." Yet the New
Englander who spoke so somberly was not a bitter
old man on the sidelines. He was just completing his
first term in the House of Representatives. When
elected to Congress in 1830 he had written:
. . . [T] his call upon me by the people of
the district in which I reside, to represent
them in Congress, has been spontaneous, and
although counteracted by a double opposition, federalist and J acksonite, I have received nearly three votes in four throughout
the district. My election as President of the
United States was not half so gratifying to
my inmost soul.
And so it was that John Quincy Adams, ever more
gloomy about the future, served in Congress for almost
two decades, fighting disunion, and the Presidential
adventurism called the Mexican War, and the spread
of slavery, until, on February 21 , 1848, he was felled
by a stroke on the floor of the House, a lawyer-citizen
dying at his post.
We all remember that, midway in John Quincy
Adams' term as President, in the afternoon of the 4th
of July, 1826, the fiftieth anniversary of the Declaration of Independence, at the home of the Adamses in
Quincy, the President's father, the old President, died.
And we recall the report, very likely apocryphal, that
the dying John Adams took comfort when he thought
of his old comrade, brother-at-the-bar, and adversary,
whose election had ended the elder Adams' public
27
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career: "Jefferson still lives." And yet at noon on that
very day, in Monticello, Jefferson died.
Here, today, in Philadelphia, Jefferson still lives, and
John Adams, and John Quincy Adams, and the Constitution they wrought for us . For lawyers there is
much to be done-much that is worthy of their calling.

Powell
(Continued from page 8)

Under the Blank plan people would, wherever possible, demonstrate their capacities on the job. Where
that would be impracticable, outside tests would serve
as the basis for employment. The organized Bar and
the medical professions have been relying on such examinations for years. In all cases the burden of proof
of their legitimacy would remain with the using agency,
The need for this type of legislation can best be
explained through the use of examples.
Hypothesize Jon S. as a typical liberal arts graduate of an urban, four year college. Upon graduation,
Jon is recruited by a large brokerage house in a northeastern city and immediately enters in its "management training program". This, of course, is follyconsidering that Jon holds a degree in Management
that if the college had done its job, Jon should be
able to enter the company's management structure after
a simple adjustment period as an intern with close
supervision to learn the ins and outs of the company
in question.
As a trainee, Jon is rotated among several of the
firm's divisions, the object being to learn the operation
inside out. He is supposed to gain technical knowhow, and experience during his training period. In addition to the on-the-job aspects of the training period,
classroom instruction is also provided in such fundamentals as "writing business letters," "proper use of
the telephone," and "public relations techniques." If
Jon's college had been functionally oriented these
courses could and should have been provided during
his degree program. Rather than have the poor boy
spend useless hours in courses that he will most probably never "use."
At the end of his six month training period, Jon is
placed in one of the firms small offices where his job
principally concerns simple advice to the average stock
buyer and a small amount of supervision over clerical help.
Jon is faced with the fact that his four years of college preparation have been either misused or wasted.
The skills he learned in the training program, not to
menion his present duties, could be handled by the
average high school graduate with the same company
training.
In recruiting Jon for his position, the company
undoubtedly passed over a number of high school
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graduates, operating in "low level" postttons in the
company who have committed themselves to the brokerage business and may well have the drive and determination to be top notch employees, if given the
chance. These employees are functioning every day
in jobs much the same as Jon is-college degree and
company training notwithstanding.
What problems do we find in reviewing the saga of
Jon S.? Preliminarily we find that college has not prepared Jon for the area of endeavor which he has
chosen to pursue. Secondly we find that the management of the brokerage house which hired Jon is out
of touch with its employees and has been "had" by
the premise that college degree brings with it, motivation, as well as verbal and social skills which the average high school graduate does not possess.
College officials contend, and rightly so, that they
can not provide adequate on the job training for the
variety of jobs which today exist. Several attempts
have been made at making on the job training possible. One of the most successful is the program at
Drexel University in Philadelphia where students are
enrolled on a work-study basis in a five year program.
After two years in a trimester program the student
spends five trimesters of the next nine working in a
field of his or her choice. The remaining four trimesters are used to attempt to provide the college based
educational experience which the student believes is
necessary for the adjustment into the working world.
Many executives on the other hand readily acknowledge that a college degree does not of itself
sensure the motivation or the verbal or social skills
needed for job performance. Nor are they sure just
what skills are most desirable for their increasingly
diverse branches. One thing is clear to them, however. A college degree is necessary.
Some industry recruiters claim that American business is using college as an employment agency. The
colleges, they say save the company time and money
since they act as screening and training agencies.
Why a supposed intellectual facility like a college
or university would allow itself to be used ::ts a service
agency for big business is not easily understood.
It is apparent that the American college is a bureauracy. We might, therefore, assume that the college
will react like a bureaucracy and follow its rules.
Anyone knows that rule # 1 of any bureauracy is
to expand. The more that a college can influence
business to restrict its "better" hiring to college graduates the bigger its hold will be on American youth.
The more American youth desiring "better" jobs, the
more students that college will have. And so the spiral
continues.
Do you know of any college or university which is
not presently employing high cost public relations
campaigns aimed at both big business and youth?
This rationale becomes even clearer when we realize that the budgets of our public universities depend
LAW ALUMNI JOURNAL
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on the number of students "serviced" and not the
quality of the students. One thing which is very clear
is that the conflict which results is very easily covered
since it is the colleges and big business's interests
which are involved.
The outlawing of degrees would be consistent with
the realities of today's job market.
At present I am sure that if you questioned any
high school junior who is looking toward college, that
student would be under the impression that the demand for college graduates is steadily increasing.
This, however, is just not true. The most optimistic
figure that I have seen show that only 15% of the
1975 job market will be open to the professional and
technical sector. More than 85% of the market will
not require a college degree and will be of the "low
level" variety.
Meanwhile 31% of our 18-24 year olds are in college and the projections in this category continue to
soar. If all of the 15% of the jobs were available to
the new grads, the number of openings would still be
woefully inadequate.
To satisfy this "overeducation" of today's youth we
find some jobs being "upgraded." Such upgrading has
resulted in the oft heard lament that even our trash
collectors are required to be high school graduates.
And, it seems fair to say, such absurd requirements
are at least a partial cause of the high levels of unemployment in our inner cities.
With the upgrading of jobs we automatically assume
that college is preparing our youth for these new positions. This is of course untrue. A clerk needs a college
education to perform systematic clerical duties about
as much as a trash collector needs a high school diploma to locate the nearest city dump.
Our scientific and technological needs have certainly bred the need for new skills, some on the highest level. At the same time this same technology has
lowered a good number of our job requirements.
Mathematical calculations performed by hand are
a far cry from the degree of skill and logic needed to
operate the new electronic calculators.
What is questionable is whether a college degree as
such is proper evidence that those new skills which
are truly needed can be delivered.
Obviously our society can and does manipulate job
status. I only hope that this manipulation is in the best
interest of all the people, not just in the best interests
of the colleges or big business.
Our society should spend more energy in trying to
upgrade the dignity of all socially useful work and in
trying to eliminate the disdain with which we presently
view the ordinary laborer.
It has been proven that work can make the educational experience meaningful to a much greater degree
than college can make work meaningful.
My concern with this cycle would be far less if
everyone caught up in the system was happy with his
Summer 1973

Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014

position. But what we have seen over the past decade
underscores my belief that our colleges, as prisons for
the economic futures of our students, bred the hostilities and apathy which has permeated our campuses.
Students have fallen victims to the public relations
pitches of both the colleges and big business and have
opted to "do their time" so to speak. The only problem with this philosophy is that the pot of gold at the
end of the rainbow has not and is not materializing.
And more frequently than not the "better" jobs are
distasteful if they materialize.
One of the major advantages of the Blank proposal would be a complete evaluation of our education
system and its goals. Something which I feel is sorely
needed at this time.
Perhaps our compulsory schools, for example, would
understand that the basic skills for work and family
life in our society would have to be provided in those
required years of schooling.
Colleges on the other hand could become less restrictive, and as open as possible to promote their
educational goals. Free to experiment and to shape
the future rather than be a part of the spiral as it
now exisits.
Our colleges would be relieved of the pressure of
"servicing" students for economic concessions. Perhaps our colleges could function much the same as our
public buildings, hours could be extensive, fees minimal, and the services available to anyone willing to
comply with the course demands and holding the necessary high school diploma.
Under the system our colleges could once again
return to their pure form , they would serve as the
meeting place for individuals willing to search for
philosophic and scientific truths.
The Blank proposal would help rid our universities
and colleges of such anarchronisms as the degree
structure. No longer would the designations of B.A.,
M.A., and Ph.D. be necessary. In this way our graduate education would freely be separated into greater
and lesser degrees of complexity in each of the disciplines and be clearly understood as what it is more
education not just another degree.
The new freedom would make programs such as
Drexel's unnecessary. After all, as successful and useful as Drexel's program is in its present form, as part
of our present system it is above all a cop-out and
tacit admission that the campus itself is unnecessary
for many genuinely educational experiences.
The legislations which Professor Blank proposes,
and which I wholeheartedly support, would help to
recapture the dignity of the workplace. It would also
lead to the increasing of the dignity of our citadels of
learning. It would help to restore to all people a sense
of their basic worth and it should prove to them that
their worth as human beings cannot be measured by
the arbitrary reception of degrees.
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Wallis
(Continued from page 9)

strike the observer as the driving lawyer she is.
In 1970, she filed and argued Santiago vs. McElroy,
a landmark case in which a three-judge Federal court
ruled that landlords who impounded and sold their
tenants' furniture without a prior hearing were violating
the Constitution.
The area of tenants' rights still interests her, although she has branched out into many new areas
since then.
She still works part time as support attorney for the
North Philadelphia Tenants Union.
"It's making great progress," she said. "The theory
is to organize the tenants in North Philadelphia to take
concerted action to improve their housing conditions.
"There are 4,000 members, organized into locals.
"Some of the people who work there are law students
and some kind of wander in. I like the idea of working
with people who share an interest in the same things.
"We write to people who are getting evicted and
offer free legal aid, handle problems reasonably related
to housing.
"Some of the problems really do require a lawyer,
although 50 to 60 per cent of the work could be
handled by anyone. A lot of the work just involves
calling Licenses and Inspections."
In recent months, her interest in tenants' rights has
been gradually taken over by the women's movement.
"The Pennsylvania Abortion Rights Association
asked me to handle a case challenging Pennsylvania's
abortion laws.
"Then I called the Women's Center and started taking some cases. There are some really great things
happening there. Women should support each otherthat's what it's all about."
Ms. Wallis is one of four children, the daughter of
a psychoanalyst.
"My father wanted me to be a doctor, but we sort of
compromised and I went to Penn Law School.
"When I went to school, there was no such thing as
Community Legal Services, although it was formed by
the time I graduated.
"There are so many programs for law students to get
involved with, and it's a great way to get experience."
One of the best indicators of Ms. Wallis' lifestyle
is her home.
A large warehouse on Rodman st. in center city,
her home has rough brick walls, unpainted floors, and
few interior walls-no compartmentalism.
Her husband, Charlie, a sculptor, is currently working on building an office for her on the first floor. (Her
office is now located in their third floor bedroom.)
They have no yard, although they have a great view
of the park across the street-"and the city takes care
30

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/plj/vol8/iss3/1

of it," she says with a laugh.
And the future?
"I never make plans for the future.
"I hope to have the intuition about what is timely
and important, so that I can deal with those things and
grow when they come along."

Levin
(Continued from page 6)

its recommendations for changes in the geographical
boundaries of the circuits as may be most appropriate
for the expeditious and effective disposition of judicial
business; and
(b) to study the structure and internal procedures
of the Federal courts of appeal system, and to report
to the President, the Congress, the Chief Justice its
recommendations for such additional changes in structure or internal procedure as may be appropriate for
the expeditious and effective disposition of the caseload of the Federal Courts of Appeals, consistent with
fundamental concepts of fairness and due process.
Professor Levin, commenting on the mandate of
the Commission, said, "the Commission is charged
with studying urgent problems in the operation of the
Federal courts of appeal. Congress has mandated that
it take a comprehensive view of the operation of the
circuit courts-the first in over three-quarters of a
century. I cannot , predict what will emerge from the
Commission's work, but there exists the potential for
change of tremendous significance to the entire
country."
Professor Levin has been a member of the Law
School faculty since 1949. He has also served as
Director of the National Institute for Trial Advocacy
and as Chairman of the Pennsylvania Legislative Reappointment Commission. He will be on leave of
absence from the University until January, 1975, when
the work of the Commission will have been completed.
The Deputy Director of the Commission is also an
alumnus of the Law School, Philip Shuchman, '53, a
professor at the University of Connecticut School of
Law. Mr. Shuchman served as Deputy Director of
the Committee on the Bankruptcy Laws of the United
States in 1971-72.

- Ruth
(Continued from page 7)

range of inquiries under Cox's jurisdiction.
The appointment of Ruth added to the strong
Kennedy flavor of the special Watergate prosecution
team. A Democrat, Ruth worked in the Justice Department from 1961 to 1965, under Presidents Kennedy and Johnson. Cox was solicitor general under
President Kennedy, and four of his other top aides
were in the Justice Department during that period.
LAW ALUMNI JOURNAL
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A Philadelphia native, Ruth attended Episcopal
Academy, Yale University and the Law School. After
serving in the Army Counter-Intelligence Corps. he
joined the Philadelphia firm of Saul, Ewing, Remick
and Saul in 1957. He left in 1961 to join the
Kennedy Administration.
During the next four year he specialized in the
Justice Department drive against organized crime in
Pennsylvania and New Jersey. He also participated
in the department's civil rights conciliation effort in
Mississippi in the summer of 1964, and helped in
planning the new concept of federal aid to local law
enforcement agencies.
From 1965 to 1967 Ruth was deputy director of
the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and
the Administration of Justice. In 1967 he joined the
faculty at the Law School, leaving in 1969 to become
director of the Justice Department's National Institute
of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice.
For the past three years he has headed New York
Mayor John Lindsay's Criminal Justice Coordinating
Council. The council's chief function was determining
how to best utilize federal law enforcement aid.
Connolly, 32, is a practicing attorney and a partner
in the Philadelphia firm of Ewing & Cohen, from
which he has taken a leave of absence. Prior to practicing in Philadelphia, Connolly served from 1968 to
1970 as Assistant to the Solicitor General of the
United States in the Department of Justice, where he
argued Federal cases before the United States Supreme
Court. He also served on the Staff of Secretary of
Defense Robert S. McNamara in 1967, and was Staff
Attorney to the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice in 1966.
Connolly is a native Philadelphian and a graduate
of the William Penn Charter School and the University
of Pennsylvania, where he was elected to Phi Beta
Kappa. He was graduated Magna Cum Laude from
the Law School and was Note Editor of the Law
Review.
Joining Ruth and Connolly will be Carl F. Feldbaum, '69, a former assistant district attorney in Philadelphia and a top aide to District Attorney Arlen
Specter.
Feldbaum, 29, will serve as an assistant special
prosecutor and report directly to Ruth.
Feldbaum was a student of both Ruth and Specter
at the Law School in a "Problems in Prosecution"
seminar which they taught jointly.
A graduate of Princeton University, Feldbaum conducted the Philadelphia District Attorney's investigation into the Penn Central's operations and the diversion of Penn Central funds to illegal subsidiaries in
which certain Penn Central officers allegedly had
interests.
Feldbaum will work primarily on the internal administration of the special group set up to investigate
the Watergate Break-in, the alleged cover-up by White
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House aides and other acts of political espionage and
sabotage during the 1972 Presidential campaign.

Freedman
(Continued from page 8)

in July 1971. He became chairman of the English
department on July 1, 1973 and will return to full-time
teaching in the fall.
Freedman has been a member of the Law School
faculty since 1964 and has served on the University
Council and Senate and also as President of the University's chapter of the American Association of University Professors. He specializes in administrative
law, family law and torts. He is serving this year as
president of the Mental Health Association of Southeastern Pennsylvania.
In announcing Freedman's appointment as ombudsman, President Meyerson stated: "The Office of the
Ombudsman under Joel Conarroe made our institution
a little more responsive and a little more humane to
dozens of students, faculty and staff. In Jim Freedman,
we have a colleague with the sensitivity, wisdom, experience and respect as both a scholar and teacher to
carry on the vital mission of this office."
Dr. Eliot Stellar, Provost of the University, said:
"The Ombudsman's role is crucial to the welt-being
of the University community. Professor Freedman
brings to it a perceptiveness to people combined with
healthy objectivity and independence. I am looking
forward to cooperating closely with him."
Freedman said: "The opportunity to serve the University as its Ombudsman is an exciting one, personally
and professionally. I hope that I can meet the high
standards of fairness and good sense that Joel Conarroe has set these last two years and that the University
community is entitled to expect.
"I also hope that during my tenure the Office of the
Ombudsman will continue to meet the challenge of
insuring that the processes by which the University
makes decisions that affect the lives and careers of its
individual members-students, faculty, and staff-are
fair as well as sensitive to human concerns."
Freedman joined the faculty of the Law School in
1964 as an assistant professor. He became associate
professor of law in 1967 and professor of law in 1969.
He was an associate in the New York law firm of Paul,
Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton and Garrison in 1963-64.
Following graduation from Yale University Law School
in 1962, he served for a year as law clerk to Judge
Thurgood Marshall, who was then a member of the
U. S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit and who
is now an associate justice of the U. S. Supreme Court.
Freedman received the bachelor of arts degree cum
laude from Harvard University in 1957. He has served
as a consultant to the Administrative Conference of
the United States since 1968. He was appointed a
member of the National Panel of Arbitrators of the
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American Arbitration Association in 1972. Freedman
served as president of the University's chapter of the
American Association of University Professors during
the 1971-72 academic year. He is the author of a
number of articles in law reviews on administrative
law. While serving as ombudsman, he will have a
reduced teaching load in the Law School.
The concept of an office of "ombudsman" originated
in Sweden early in the nineteenth century when the
first ombudsman was appointed to report incidents of
administrative malfeasance to the parliament. The
Ombudsman was given the power to supervise the
observance of laws in that country and had access to
official files and documents. He could not reverse decisions nor press charges against those suspected of
wrongdoing. The real power of his position lay in the
prestige of the office and in its ability to command
widespread publicity for its pronouncements, and in its
unlimited accessibility to any individual with a complaint. Sweden's example was followed by a number
of other countries-and recently by various American
universities.

Jones
(Continued from page 9)

Director of the Office of Economic OpportunityOffice of Legal Services.
From 1968 to 1970 he was an administrative lawyer
(appeals and special projects) with the Legal Aid
Bureau of Chicago. In 1964 and 1965 Mr. Jones
served as a cooperating attorney for the N.A.A.C.P.
Educational and Legal Defense Fund, Inc., and the
Lawyers Constitutional Defense Committee in Jackson, Mississippi. From 1958 to 1964 he taught 8th
grade in the Chicago Public School system.
Mr. Jones serves on the Committee for Public
Justice, the Committee for Legal Services in Developing Countries of the International Legal Center;
the board of directors of several legal services programs throughout the United States, and as ViceChairman of the National Advisory Committee to the
Corporation for Public Broadcasting.
The Dean voiced optimism that "Frank Jones,
whose track record is one of unbroken successes, will
be an admirable, creative administrator who will enhance legal education at Penn."

Flanagan
(Continued from page 40)

countability must be to the public, for it is the public
for whose benefit the office was established. The client
can never be the incumbent, for when a lawyer becomes responsible to an incumbent rather than an
office the stage is set for toadying, favoritism and the
rule of men and not of law.
On a recent return trip from Washington, D. C.
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where the Washington Alumni Club held its annual
meeting, I commented to Dean Wolfman that the apparent conduct of some of the lawyers in government
seemed inconsistent with any study in depth of the
principles of the United States Constitution and its
foundations in the common law. Their conduct, instead, constituted a rejection of principles of American
law. The personal standards of these men seemed more
consistent with procedures grounded in Fascism than
in the fair play embodied in our standards of due
process. I asked the Dean what was the status of the
Law School's approach to the teaching of standards of
professional conduct and legal ethics. He replied that
the Law School faculty in the teaching of law does it
more effectively indirectly by their attitudes of right
thinking than they could by a direct course on the
subject. I had to agree with the Dean. Who among us
experienced courses with Keedy, Reeve, Frey, Chadbourne, Schwartz, Hannold or Fordham, to name a few,
and failed to learn ethical standards of conduct as well
as the meat of the particular course.
A mental image of Ned Keedy's bull's eye chalked
on the board served to emphasize how wide of the
mark those lawyers had been in their thinking. They
never would have understood Alex Frey's "wowsin" in
appreciating the broad picture. And Foster Reeve's
course in trusts might have instructed them that eternal
vigilance is the price of safety in handling the affairs
of clients and selL The mark of each teacher, in his
own way, was respect for law and obedience to the rule
of law. The example of their lives was as vital a part
of the legal education at Penn as was any portion of
course content.
Dean Wolfman had no need to cite the continued
high standard of moral leadership maintained by our
younger faculty with whom I have had some, but not
nearly enough, contact. His own and his faculty's
moral leadership in recent times have been demonstrated in, for example, their reaction to the youth
movement in the Law School including recognition of
the right of students to be heard in faculty councils.
Extracurricular programs in which alumni have been
privileged to participate have added to the rounding
out of current legal education. Recent examples have
included the debate over preventive detention in which
then Deputy Attorney General Kleindeinst debated the
matter with a brilliant and gifted young Harvard law
professor and the Roberts Lectures which, within the
last two years; have included Dean Griswold and Judge
Hastie. And, there have been the alumni sponsored
student receptions which are now beginning to swing
into high gear.
The recent graduates with whom I have come into
contact are products of an atmosphere at the Law
School where the standards of American law are lived
as well as taught. Still there is no room for complacency. The striving for excellence must be a conLAW ALUMNI JOURNAL
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tinuing one. Our physical equipment including classrooms, dormitories and library are among the best in
the country. Our administration and faculty are in the
continuing high traditions of Penn. As alumni, it is a
source of pride to observe this excellence in action, but
it continues to be our privilege and duty to keep things
that way.

Alumni Day
(Continued from page 11)

'58, '63, '68 and the graduating class. The featured
luncheon speaker was Assistant Professor Stephen
Schulhofer.
Following at 2 P.M. was the seminar on the proposed
federal rules moderated by Professor A. Leo Levin.
Participating were Ron. Ruggero J. Aldisert, of the
U .S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, Ron.
Alfred L. Luongo of the U.S. District Court for the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania and Ron. Theodore
0. Rogers of the Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court.
The annual meeting of the Society began at 5 P.M.
in the foyer of the new building. The report from President Joseph P. Flanagan , Jr. was followed by Dean
Wolfman's report and the presentation of the Law '33
Scroll of Immortals by Robert J. Callaghan.
Thereafter, Norma L. Shapiro made the presentation
of this year's Distinguished Service Award to Bernard
G. Segal, '31.
The election of officers followed the presentation to
Segal. Nominated and elected were:
-Joseph P. Flanagan, Jr. '25-President
-Edwin P. Rome, '40-First Vice President
-Thomas N. O'Neill, Jr., '53-Second Vice
President
-David H. Marion, '63-Secretary
-Sharon Kaplan Wallis, '67-Treasurer
Elected to the Board of Managers were Patricia Ann
Metzer, '66, of Boston, Robert M. Beckman, '56 of
Washington and Thomas A. O'Boyle, '40 of New
York City.
A new feature of the program was an Alumnae
Coffee Hour on Saturday, May 5th at 10:30 A.M. in
the Faculty Lounge.

News Notes
The Washington, D. C. Law Alumni Club held its
annual spring meeting at the Army-Navy Club in
Washington in May.
The New Jersey Alumni Club held its annual luncheon in conjunction with the New Jersey State Bar
meetings in Atlantic City on May 19.
The Law Alumni Society hosted a reception for
alumni attending the meetings of the American Bar
Association in August. The reception was held at the
Washington home of Mr. and Mrs. Morton H. Wilner.
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For the past two years the Black Law Students
Union has provided a free income tax service for the
black community of Philadelphia. In cooperation with
Reverend M. Lorenzo Shepard, Jr., Pastor of Mount
Olivet Tabernacle Baptist Church at 42nd and Wallace
Streets, the program was able to service more than 200
people who needed help with their tax problems, but
who were least able to afford to pay for competent
service.
The program was conceived and conducted with
one of stated goals of the Black Law Students Union
in mind: developing viable programs that will aid the
black community. It was felt by the membership that
many people in the community are victimized by incompetent overcharging practitioners whose only concern is with the amount of their fee.
The service was provided on Wednesday evenings
at the Community Center of Mount Olivet Tabernacle
Baptist Church. A church was selected as the location
because it was felt that there, a large number of people would be available to take advantage of the
service. Mount Olivet is centrally located in the black
community of West Philadelphia. An additional factor was the attempt of the Black Law Students Union
to emphasize that this program was designed solely
to benefit the community and any benefits accruing
to students was secondary. This in large part contributed to the program's success; for many projects
in which students participate the emphasis is on students picking up skills or practicing without any substantial benefits accruing to the community that is
to be served.
The Black Law Students Union intends to continue
this program and hopes to develop others that will aid
the black community of Philadelphia.
The Daniel Lowenthal Law Student Financial Aid
Fund has been established in the Law School by the
family and friends of Daniel Lowenthal.
This Fund does honor to the memory of Daniel
Lowenthal, a distinguished lawyer, a graduate of the
Law School Class of 1931. The Fund symbolizes the
values of Daniel Lowenthal who believed deeply in
the law, in its processes, and in legal education. It is
designed to provide financial aid for worthy law students who wish to pursue the law but lack the means
to do so on their own.
The Fund shall be invested by the University and
its income shall, in the discretion of the Dean of the
Law School, be used to provide scholarship or loan
support to law students in need. In the Dean's discretion, the principal of the Fund may also be used for
loans to law students, but only income may be used
for scholarships. Loans shall be made on such terms
as to repayment and interest as the Dean, in his discretion, may deem appropriate in each case.
This Fund may be augmented by future gifts from
those wishing to support its purposes and do honor to
the memory of Daniel Lowenthal.
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Faculty And
Staff Notes

Helena F. Clark

Placement Director HELENA F. CLARK was
elected President-elect of the National Association of
Law Placement at their June conference in Houston,
Texas. N.A.L.P. was "born" at the University of
Pennsylvania in August 1971 when 35 law placement
directors from around the country gathered to discuss
organizing such an association. The need for national
communications among law placement directors and
law recruiters in order to work out their mutual problems, to discuss the future trends in legal hiring, and
to do much needed research lead the 35 to enthusiastically draw-up a constitution, elect officers and appoint
a steering committee. The Association has grown to
130 members, 101 law schools and 29 legal recruiters.
Ms. Clark was last year's membership chairman and
on the original steering committee. She had the responsibility for organizing the workshops given at the
annual conference last year and this year.
Ms. Clark came to the Law School in July 1968
after eight years in placement work with prior experience in all areas of social work, retailing and dean of
women's work. She is a University of Delaware graduate with graduate work in Social Work at the University of Pennsylvania and Bryn Mawr College.

Noyes Leech

Three new full-time faculty members have been
appointed, effective July 1, 1973. They are:
FRANK I. GOODMAN, Visidng Professor of Law
LAURIE WOHL, Assistant Professor of Law
MARK SPIEGEL, Assistant Professor of Law
Professor WOHL is a 1968 cum laude graduate of
Columbia University Law School. During her second
and third years she served on the Law Review, and at
graduation tied with one other for the Jane Marks
Murphy Prize awarded to the woman student with the
highest average in the class. After graduation, she
clerked for Judge Charles M. Metzner on the United
States District Court for the Southern District of New
York, practiced with Debevoise, Plimpton, Lyons and
Gates in New York City, taught law in Nairobi, and
now teaches Corporations, Securities Regulation, and
Welfare Law ~t Northeastern University Law School
in Boston.
Professor GOODMAN graduated cum laude from
Harvard Law School in 1959, having served on the
Law Review for two years. In 1959-60, he clerked
for Judge William H. Hastie on the Third Circuit.
Thereafter, he served as Special Assistant to the Federal Power Commission's General Counsel, as an
Assistant Solicitor General, and as a member of the
Law Faculty at Berkeley. He practiced with the Los
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Angeles law firm of Beilenson, Meyer, Rosenfeld and
Sussman. At present, Mr. Goodman is the Director of
Research of the Administrative Conference of the
United States. His article, "De Facto School Segregation: A Constitutional and Empirical Analysis," 60
Calif. L. Rev. 275-437 (1972), has won wide acclaim
as the best piece of scholarship in its field. Mr. Goodman's principal teaching interests are in Constitutional
Law and Torts.
Assistant Professor of Law SPIEGEL will be concerned principally with the development, coordination
and direction of clinical legal education. He comes
with a rich background: Assistant Director of the
Mandel Clinic at the University of Chicago, a Reginald
Heber Smith Fellow, and-before that-law school at
the University of Chicago from which he graduated
in 1968 with a distinguished academic record.
New part-time faculty are:
ALAN J. DAVIS, Advanced Criminal Procedure
ALEXANDER BROOI):S, Evidence
LINDA K. LEE, Legislation Course and Seminar
THOMAS N. O'NEILL, JR., Appellate Advocacy
DOLORES KORMAN SLOVITER, Civil
Procedure
EDMUND B. SPAETH, JR., Evidence
LOUIS HENKIN, Constitution and Foreign Affairs
(Seminar)

Louis B. Schwartz

Professor JAMES 0. FREEDMAN delivered a paper
entitled "The Administrative Process and the Elderly"
at a Symposium on New Approaches to Legal and
Related Services for Older Persons" held at Syracuse
University Law School in March. Earlier that month
he spoke on "The Legal Rights of Children" before the
Regional Council of Child Psychiatry in Philadelphia.
Professor Freedman also spoke to the Faculty Tea
Club on "Emerging Issues in Family Law."
Professor ALEXANDER M. CAPRON discussed
"Man's Control Over Man" on February 27, in the
Virginia Tech's Donaldson Brown Center for Continuing Education auditorium.
Sponsored by the University's Visiting Scholar Program, Capron's public lecture was the last of a threepart series dealing with "Man's Advances in Medicine
and Their Implications for Society."
Capron also addressed an international consultation
on Genetics and the Quality of Life in Zurich on the
topic of prenatal diagnosis and abortion and was a
member of a panel on Death and Dying at the joint
Mexico City meeting of the American Association for
Advancement of Science and the Consejo Nacional
de Ciencia y Technologia-both in June.
He also testified before Senator Edward Kennedy's
Subcommittee on Health on "Experimentation in
Prisons" in March and served on the search committee
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for a new dean of the University's School of Veterinary
Medicine. He has also reviewed N. Kittrie's "The
Right To Be Different" in the April issue of the Columbia Law Review.
Professor NOYES LEECH participated in the 23rd
Annual Forum on Finance in New York City in June.
The Forum was sponsored by the N.Y.U. Graduate
School of Business Administration and the Joint Committee on Education.
Professor STEPHEN R . GOLDSTEIN has published
a book commentary, The Unions and the Cities, in
22 Buffalo L. Rev. 603, concerning collective bargaining by public school teachers and he lectured on School
Board Policy and the Rights of Individuals to the 26th
Annual School Boards Conference of the New England
School Development Council in May.
Placement Director HELENA F. CLARK spoke to
hiring partners of law firms across the country on the
topic "Relationships With Law School Placement
Offices and Students" at the Conference of American
Legal Executives in New York City in May.
She also conducted a workshop for new law placement directors at the Conference of National Associations of Law Placement in Houston in June.

ARNOLD J. MILLER has a commentary on the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure titled "Enforcement
of Judgments in Special Actions" scheduled for publication by the Lawyers Cooperative as part of the
Goodrich-Amram series.
Professor Lours B. SCHWARTZ has completed and
submitted to the Subcommittee on Criminal Laws and
Procedures two long memoranda analyzing various
pending proposals to reform the federal criminal code.
These proposals include the McClellan Bill, S.1 and
the Administration Bill, S.1400, introduced by Senator
Hruska. Both senators were members of the National
Commission on Reform of the Federal Criminal Laws,
of which Professor Schwartz served as Director. The
bills derive from the Report of the National Commission (sometimes referred to as the Brown commission
from the name of its chairman, former Governor of
California Edmund G. (Pat) Brown). However, as
Professor Schwartz's memos reveal, they depart so
radically from the Brown Commission Code as to
amount to a virtual rejection of its basic philosophy.
Professor RALPH S. SPRITZER is currently serving
as consultant to the Administrative Conference of the
United States and to the Ford Foundation. In June
and July he attended the "Summer Economics Institute
for Law Professors" at the University of Rochester.

Alumni Notes
1908

LEON J. OBERMA YER, of Philadelphia, president
of the Class of 1904 of Philadelphia's Central High
School, presided over the class' 69th reunion in June.
Nine members of the class were in attendance, among
them ISAAC ASH, '08, and THOMAS HYNDMAN,
'11.

1926
W. JAMES MaciNTOSH, of Philadelphia, has been
elected a director of Horn and Hardart Baking Company. Macintosh is a senior partner in the firm of
Morgan, Lewis & Bockius and former chairman of
Curtis Publishing Co.

1930
!SIDOR OSTROFF, of Philadelphia, has been elected
a vice president of the Consular Law Society of New
York, the first time an out-of-state officer has been
elected to . the position. He is an associate member
dating back to his service as honorary consul for
of the Philadelphia Consular Corps Association,
Guatemala.
SAMUEL E. EWING, of Washington, D. C., has
retired as vice president, Washington, of RCA
Corporation.

1933
JEROME L. MARKOVITZ, of Philadelphia, reports
36
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that the class of 193 3 held their 40th reunion at the
Locust Club on June 9 with 19 members of the class
in attendance. Professor Alexander Frey, Hon. Israel
Packel, Pennsylvania Attorney General, and Mrs.
Packel were the guests of honor. Members of the
class in attendance were: WILLIAM C. WISE, EDWARD FIRST, JOSEPH H. FLANZER, NATHAN
SILBERSTEIN, FRANCIS J. MORRISSEY, JR.,
DAVID H. ROSENBLUTH, GUSTAVE G . . AMSTERDAM, B. N. RICHTER, SIDNEY CHAIT,
JOSEPH M. LEIB, MAX M. BATZER, CHARLES
FINK, HON. JAMES L. STERN, A. MOORE
LIFTER, PAUL MALONEY, EDWARD A. KAlER,
JAMES L. JOHNSON, and EUGENE K. TWINING.

1936
G. WILLIAM SHEA, of Los Angeles, Calif., has
become president of the Los Angeles County Bar
Association.

1938
SYLVAN M. COHEN, of Philadelphia, reports that
the class of 1938 planned to hold their 35th reunion
in Puerto Rico over the Memorial Day weekend.

1939
CARL HELMETAG, JR., of Philadelphia, became
general counsel-reorganization of the Penn Central
Transportation Company on March I.
LAW ALUMNI JOURNAL
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1941
R. STEWART RAUCH, JR., of Villanova, Pa.,
chairman of the Philadelphia Savings Fund Society,
has become chairman of the Greater Philadelphia
Chamber of Commerce.
OSCAR GOLDBERG, of Denver, Colorado, reports
that he has settled in that city and plans to be admitted to the Colorado Bar.

1943
MILES K. KIRKPATRICK, of Philadelphia, former
chairman of the Federal Trade Commission, has become a member of the Philadelphia firm of Morgan,
Lewis & Bockius.

1948
SCOTT W. SCULLY, of Portland, Maine, has been
appointed general counsel of the Maine Central Railroad Company and the Portland Terminal Company.
WALTER R. SPARKS, JR., of Berwyn, Pa., has
been elected secretary of the Insurance Company of
North America.

1951
GERALD JONATHAN HAAS, of Philadelphia, has
been reelected vice president of the Philadelphia
branch of the United Synagogue of America.

1952

Walter R. Sparks, Jr., '48

HERBERT A. FOGEL, of Philadelphia, has been
appointed to the bench of the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.

1953

··-

PAUL R. DUKE, of Philadelphia, has been ap-

pointed general counsel-legal department of the Penn
Central Transportation Co.

1955
VIRGIL B. BALDI, of New York, N.Y., has been
elected a vice president and director of the New
York firm of Canny, Bowen, Howard, Peck &
Associates, Inc.
IRVING M. HIRSH, of Plainfield, N.J., has been appointed a judge of the Municipal Court of North
Plainfield; N. J.

1959
GEORGE F. REED, of Houston, Texas, was recently
elected senior vice president and counsel and a
member of the board of directors of the American
General Insurance Company in Houston.
SAMUEL H. KARSCH, of Philadelphia, has become
a partner in the Philadelphia firm of Townsend, Elliott
& Munson.

1960
RONALD ZIEGLER, of Philadelphia, has been
elected Pennsylvania Judge Advocate for the Jewish
War Veterans of the U.S.A.

1961

Miles K. Kirkpatrick, '43
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JACK K. MANDEL, of Anaheim, Cal., has been
named to the board of directors of the Orange
County Trial Lawyers Association and to the advisory board of the criminal justice department of the
California State University at Fullerton.
JAMES N. HORWOOD, of Reston, Va., has become
associated with the Washington firm of Spiegel & Me37
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Diarmid. He was formerly deputy assistant general
counsel to the Postal Rate Commission.

1962
FREDERICK J. FRANCIS, of Pittsburgh, Pa., has
become a partner in the Pittsburgh firm of Meyer,
Unkovic & Scott.

1963
R. ALAN STOTSENBURG, of New York, N. Y.,
writes that he has a private practice as a specialist in
securities and anti-trust class actions.

1964
MICHAEL A. O'PAKE, of Reading, Pa., has become
associated with the Reading firm of Austin, Speicher,
Boland, Connor & Giorgi.
JAMES ROBERT PARISH, of New York, N. Y.,
is co-author of "The George Raft File," to be published later this year.

1965
LITA INDZEL COHEN, of Merion, Pa., is the first
woman ever appointed to the Lower Merion Planning
Commission.
MARIO A. IA VOCOLI, of Haddonfield, N.J., is
first assistant prosecutor for Camden County, N.J.
and is also counsel to the New Jersey "No Fault"
Commission. He had previously been counsel to the
Speaker of the New Jersey General Assembly.
THEODORE A. FLERON, of Baltimore, Md., has
been elected vice president and secretary of Sun
Equities, Inc., a broker-dealer subsidiary of Sun Life
Insurance Company of America. He will continue in

Jonathan Vipond, '70

his present position as counsel for the company.

1966
ARTHUR B. JACOBS, of San Jose, Calif., formed a
partnership with Charles Wasserman, Jr. and is now
practicing under the firm name of Wasserman &_
Jacobs in San Jose, Calif.
WILLIAM N. LEVY, of Cherry Hill, N.J., announces
the removal of the offices of Levy & Levy to One
Cherry Hill, Suite 706, Cherry Hill, N.J.
PAUL P . WELSH, of Wilmington, Del., has become a
member of the Wilmington firm of Morris, Nichols,
Arsht & Tunnell. Also named as members of the
firm are WALTER L. PEPPERMAN, II, '67, and
WILLIAM 0. LaMOTTE, III, '68.

1967

Peter A. Gross, '69
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DANIEL E. FARMER, of Philadelphia, has been
named a partner in the Philadelphia firm of MacCoy,
Evans & Lewis. He previously served as law clerk to
former Philadelphia Common Pleas Court Judge Edmund B. Spaeth, Jr. and head of the Juvenile Law
Reform Unit of Community Legal Services of
Philadelphia.
STEPHEN SCHOEMAN, of New Rochelle, N.Y., has
been elected president to Team Emblems, Inc.
IRA M. GOLDBERG, of Cherry Hill, N.J., is an
associate professor of law at Rutgers University
School of Law at Camden, teaching constitutional law
and conflicts.
NORMAN PEARLSTINE, of Tokyo, Japan, has been
named the Wall Street Journal's Tokyo bureau chief.
LAW ALUMNI JOURNAL
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He was previously with the paper's Los Angeles
bureau.
1968
DA VlD I. GRUNFELD, of Philadelphia, has become
a partner in the Philadelphia firm of Steinberg, Greenstein, Richman & Price.
NORMAN B. SKYDELL, of New York, N.Y., has
become a member of the New York firm of Kass,
Goodkind, Wechsler & Gerstein.
N. P. WARDWELL, of Watertown, N.Y., returned
to this country after a 2Y2 year tour of duty in
Ethiopia as a judge advocate in the U.S. Army. In
January, he climbed to Uhuru Peak on top of Mt.
Kilimanjaro in Tanzania.
BRUCE JOEL JACOBSOHN, of Philadelphia, has
been appointed senior assistant regional labor counsel
for the eastern region of the United States Postal
Service, covering the mid-Atlantic states and New
England.
1969
NEIL H . COGAN of Dallas, Texas, will become assistant professor at the Southern Methodist University
School of L aw in August.
DOUGLAS A. ELDRIDGE, of Syracuse, N. Y., has
been promoted to chief attorney at Onondaga Neighborhood Legal Services, Inc. in Syracuse and elected
president of the Coalition for Health and Welfare of
Syracuse and Onondaga County.
JOHN CRAIG GREEN, of Saigon, Viet Nam, was
recently made legal advisor to the Defense Attache
Office, U.S. Embassy in Saigon, after serving a year
as the special assistant to the Deputy to the

Commander, U.S. Military Assistance Command in
VietNam.
PETER A. GROSS, of New York, N.Y., has joined
TelePrompTer Corporation's legal department as
corporate counsel. He was formerly associated with
the New York firm of Dewey, Ballantine, Bushby,
Palmer & Wood.
1970
JONATHAN VIPOND, of Waverly, Pa., was elected
a member of the Pennsylvania House of Representatives in November of last year.
1971
KENNETH V. HELAND, of Salisbury, Md. , has become a partner in the Salisbury firm of Richardson ,
Regan, Anderson & Heland.
ARTHUR W. LEFCO, of Philadelphia, is now general counsel of the Philadelphia Housing Authority.
ROBERT B. LAMM, of New York, N.Y., is associated with the New York firm of Wofsey, Certilman,
Haft, Snow & Becker. As of May, he and his wife
Carol, CW'68 , were awaiting the birth of their first
child.
ROGER E. KOHN, of Hinesburg, Vt., has left Vermont Legal Aid, Inc. to form the partnership of Villa
& Cohn in Hinesburg, near Burlington.
1972
ROBERT M. WALTER, of Bethel Park, Pa., is associated with the Pittsburgh firm of Reed, Smith, Shaw
& McClay.
RICHARD D. BANK, of Dresher, Pa., has become a
partner in the Norristown/Glenside firm of Bank,
Shor, Levin & Weiss.

Necrology
1903
BENJAMIN . DINTENFASS, Penllyn, Pa

1908
LEIGH M. MORSS, Scranton, Pa., January 1.

1912
CLARENCE E. DAVIS, Ebensburg , Pa., January 31 .
EDMUND H. ROGERS, Philadelphia, January 24.

1913
HON. SAMUEL Y. ROSSITER, Erie , Pa. , March 8.

1914
WILLIAM N. OTTINGER, Philadelphia, October 11, 1972.

1915
JOSEPH N. EWING , Valley Forge, Pa., June 11.

1916
WALTER L. RODMAN , Lansdowne, Pa., April 23.
JACOB H. SHERRARD , Brownsville , Pa., May 16.
THOMAS E. SHIPLEY, Philadelphia, June 14.
HERBERT P. SUNDHEIM , Philadelphia, April 18.

1917
WAYNE H. IRVINE, Philadelphia.
MORTON WITKIN , Philadelphia, April 20.

1920
WALTER S. HARE, Allentown , Pa ., April 23.

1921
A. SAMUEL BUCHMAN , Philadelphia, March 2.

1922
J. H. WARD HINKSON , Wallingford , Pa., June 1.

1924
FRANKLIN G. BANKS, Philadelphia, March 6.
SIDNEY KAPLAN, Merchantville, N.J. , May 5.
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1928
HON. RALPH
BODY,
C.

Boyertown , Pa ., June 2.

1929
SIMON MUSTOKOFF, Philadelphia, March 1.

1931
WALTER J. BROBYN, Philadelphia, June 24.
JOHN M. DUDRICK, Nanticoke, Pa., January 5.
DUDLEY T. EASBY, JR. , Philadelphia, March 16.

1933
JOHN J. GAIN , Philadelphia, June 4.

1935
H. PARR JOHNSON, Mclean , Va. , March 11.

1937
IVAN M. CZAP, Philadelphia , February 10.

1938
ANTONIO ELLENI, Arlington, Va., September 12, 1972.

1941
JOHN V. BOLAND, Reading , Pa., August 16, 1969.

1949
JACKSON W. RAYSOR , Milford, Del., April 21.
CASPAR W. B. TOWNSEND, JR. , April 23.

1951
JOHN C. CLEMENS, Reading , Pa. , January 13.
ALVIN DIAMOND, Willow Grove , Pa. , April 9.
RICHARD H. TALLANT, Wilmington , Del., April 12.

1956
PAUL A. LEVY, Philadelphia, May 6.

1972
THOMAS M. WRIGHT, Reading , Pa., March 13.
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Alumni Society

President's Message
By Joseph P. Flanagan, Jr.

The American version of Greek Tragedy that
opened this summer involved a conspicuously large
number of lawyers. Most of them were ably practicing their profession in the representation of the
various parties before the Senate Committee-counsel
for the Committee itself and lawyers for the majority
and minority members and of witnesses before the
Committee. A minority of lawyers who appeared on
the scene were there as actors in the drama-lawyers
called to account for their actions or advice or lack of
it in their capacity as counsel for government officials.
These were lawyers who have been caught in the sweep
of a movement so powerful that they became a part of
it, flowed along helplessly with it and, when it subsided, were left stranded. .
The drama would never have been played if the
lawyers involved had maintained their independence as
a prime obligation. These men were learned in the law,
of greater than ordinary brightness, and clearly capable
of the highest and most intense devotion to a cause.
Their mistake was one of identity - who was their
client?
The client, for lawyers in government, must be the
office or body for which they are counsel. Their ac(Continued on page 32)
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